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Attorney Advice and the First Amendment
Renee Newman Knake∗
Abstract
An attorney’s advice for navigating and, when necessary, challenging
the law is essential to American democracy. Yet the constitutional
protection afforded to this category of speech is not clear; indeed, some
question whether it should be protected at all. While legal ethics scholars
have addressed attorney speech in other circumstances, none has focused
exclusively on the First Amendment protection for attorney advice,
particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s recent attention to the matter.
Nor have constitutional law scholars given this issue the attention it
deserves, though they acknowledge that it presents an important and
unresolved question within First Amendment jurisprudence.
This Article is the first to offer a detailed analysis of free speech
protection for advice rendered by an attorney. Attention to this topic is
especially timely given the Supreme Court’s recent focus on advice bans in
statutes that address bankruptcy abuse and antiterrorism. These cases
illustrate important considerations regarding two previously unresolved
questions in First Amendment jurisprudence: first, whether legal advice is
protected under the First Amendment and second, if so, to what extent may
the government constitutionally restrict legal advice.
Part II of the Article reviews the Court’s recent opinions on the two
advice bans, neither of which directly addressed the First Amendment’s
application, though both stand as stark examples of the important concerns
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. J.D., The
University of Chicago Law School (1999). This Article was presented at the 2010 Law and
Society Annual Meeting as part of the Heintz Tribute Panel on the Professional Autonomy
of Lawyers and the 2010 International Legal Ethics Conference IV held at Stanford Law
School, and I wish to thank participants at both events for their helpful insights. The Article
also benefited from comments received at a University of Illinois College of Law faculty
workshop in August 2010 and the 2010 Michigan State University Junior Scholars
Conference. I am especially grateful to Peter Margulies, Judith Maute, and Geof Stone for
detailed comments and suggestions on an early draft as well as to Kristi Bowman, Robert
Gordon, Michael Lawrence, Larry Solum, Glen Stasewski, and Ben Walther for thoughtful
feedback on this project. Tyler Gaastra, Christopher Iannuzzi, and Carrie Waggoner
provided excellent research assistance. Finally, I thank the Michigan State University
College of Law for support, including the award of a generous summer research stipend.

639

640

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639 (2011)

at stake when the government legislatively constricts access to legal advice.
Part III of the Article reframes attorney speech precedent from other
contexts and assesses relevant constitutional theory to support the
conclusion that attorney advice deserves strong protection. Part IV reflects
on the circumstances in which an attorney’s advice may be constitutionally
constrained, and concludes with a summary of mechanisms preferable to
advice bans for addressing concerns about problematic legal advice.
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I. Introduction
Is the advice an attorney gives to a client protected by the First
Amendment?1 If so, in what circumstances and for what reasons may the
government constitutionally restrict legal advice? The Supreme Court has
not directly addressed this issue, though legal ethics and First Amendment
scholars recognize that these questions raise an important debate.2 This
Article explores these questions by examining Supreme Court precedent on
attorney speech as well as underlying constitutional theory in light of two
cases involving federal bans on legal advice taken up by the Court during
the 2009 term.3 The Article concludes that the First Amendment protects
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.").
2. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571, 571
(2005) (using the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 to
illustrate the constitutional issues that arise in prohibiting attorney advice); see also Eugene
Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct,
"Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1284,
1343 (2005) [hereinafter Volokh, Speech] (observing that the Supreme Court "has never
squarely confronted" the First Amendment status of "professional advice to clients").
3. See infra Part II.A–B (discussing Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
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advice rendered by attorneys to their clients, and that legal advice may be
constitutionally restricted in only very limited circumstances. As to the
precise contours of those circumstances, the Article’s conclusion takes up
some of the easier and more difficult cases in an effort to spark further
discussion and analysis in this area.
Attorneys render advice.4 Without the ability to render independent
and candid legal advice, attorneys and, importantly, their clients have
nothing.5 As Professor Stephen Pepper wrote in his seminal article on the
lawyer’s counseling at the limits of the law:
Our legal system is premised on the assumption that law is intended to
be known or knowable, that law is in its nature public information. The
"rule of law" as we understand it requires promulgation. . . . And one
fundamental, well-understood aspect of the lawyer’s role is to be the
conduit for that promulgation. In a complex legal environment much
law cannot be known and acted upon, cannot function as law, without
lawyers to make it accessible to those for whom it is relevant.6

An attorney’s advice makes law accessible to the client. Yet even greater
interests are jeopardized when an attorney’s power to provide counsel is
impaired by external regulation.7 The role of an attorney in navigating and,
States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010), and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705
(2010), both involving issues of restrictions on attorney advice).
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010) ("In representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice."); R.
1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.").
5. See id. (explaining the responsibilities); see also Frederick Schauer, The Speech of
Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687, 688 (1997) [hereinafter Schauer, The
Speech] ("As lawyers, speech is our stock in trade . . . . [Our speech] is not only central to
what the legal system is all about, and not only the product of the law as we know it, but
basically the only thing that lawyers and the legal system have."); Fred Zacharias, Lawyers
as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1391 (2004) [hereinafter Zacharias, Lawyers as
Gatekeepers] ("At a minimum, lawyers owe clients information, including information that
suggests that the clients’ proposed or completed conduct is criminal (or wrongful in other
respects). Especially when a client may initially be uninformed, lawyers owe it to the client
to identify and explain all the ramifications of particular behavior . . . ."); infra notes 233–50
and accompanying text (discussing the ethical obligations of attorneys to advise their clients
as required by professional conduct rules).
6. Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547–48 (1995).
7. The concept of external regulation includes state and federal legislative control
over lawyer conduct. Internal regulation, by contrast, refers to professional conduct rules
drafted by the American Bar Association for adoption and enforcement by state courts. For
further discussion of the distinction between internal and external regulation of lawyers, see
generally Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation of Law
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when necessary, challenging the law is a critical component of American
democratic government.8 The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the
unique purpose of attorney advice where "under the conditions of modern
government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a
minority to petition for redress of grievances."9 A necessary predicate to
meaningful, effective litigation is the attorney’s advice to her client about
the client’s legal rights and the proposed course of action.
Consider further Alexis de Tocqueville’s early observation that
attorneys "are the most powerful existing security against the excesses of
democracy" given "the authority . . . entrusted to members of the legal
profession, and the influence that these individuals exercise in the
government."10 Robert Gordon observes that the republican tradition or
virtue "influenc[ing] Tocqueville’s view of American lawyers," while now
"rather out of fashion," remains a concept that "in fact we cannot do

Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 559 (2005).
8. See, e.g., Rakesh K. Anand, The Role of the Lawyer in the American Democracy,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611, 1633 (2009) (noting that the lawyer facilitates the changing of
beliefs that are no longer vibrant in society); David Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral
Obligations: A Comment on Simon, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 255, 259 (1996) (arguing that
"because lawyers are often better positioned than nonlawyers to realize the unfairness or
unreasonableness of a law, lawyers often should be among the first . . . to counsel others that
it is acceptable to violate or nullify it"); Peter Margulies, When to Push the Envelope: Legal
Ethics, the Rule of Law, and National Security Strategy, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 642, 643
(2007) (arguing in the context of national security that when certain conditions are met, "the
lawyer for the executive should recommend the action, even if it appears inconsistent with
the letter of existing law"); Geoffrey R. Stone, A Lawyer’s Responsibility: Protecting Civil
Liberties in Wartime, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 55 (2006) ("It is the legal profession
that is most fundamentally responsible for helping the nation strike the right balance
[between national security and civil liberties] and for defending our freedoms."). But see
David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima
Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 292 (1996) ("By the same
token . . . noncompliance by lawyers is likely to have larger negative consequence . . . .
Given their status as knowledgeable insiders, lawyers have a greater ability to avoid the
kinds of checks and balances that either constrain or legitimate law breaking by ordinary
citizens.").
9. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); see also United Mine Workers of
Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223–24 (1967) (reinforcing that the First
Amendment protections established in Button extend beyond "political matters of acute
social moment" and that "[g]reat secular causes, with small ones, are guarded") (citations
omitted); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A
DEMOCRATIC AGE 185 (2008) ("One might say, then, that what democracy is to political
legitimacy at wholesale, adjudication is to political legitimacy at retail.").
10. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 253–54 (Henry Reeve trans.,
1838).
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without."11 Though Professor Gordon directs his arguments toward
supporting a lawyer’s independence from her client, this Article contends
the same arguments reveal why an attorney’s advice must be independent
from control by the very institution creating the law.12 The separation of
powers so imperative to American democracy demands nothing less.
Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith make a similar point about the
significance of attorney advice, stating that "people with grievances against
one another come to lawyers as an alternative to resorting to physical
violence, and society, through the legal system, provides a socially
controlled, nonviolent process of dispute resolution. Lawyers play an
indispensable part in that constructive social process."13 Yet attorney
advice informs and sustains the legal system in ways well beyond advocacy
and dispute resolution. As Professor Gordon explains:
[L]aw also needs lawyers: agents who communicate the rules through
advice to private clients and governments and enable them to organize
their businesses and structure their transactions and comply with
regulations and tax laws and constitutional limitations; and who can
negotiate and if necessary litigate with the state and other private parties
when their claims of rights are impaired or disputed.14

Furthermore, James Fischer concludes that the consequence of legislative
control "over lawyer practice may come to erode the ability of lawyers to
serve as a bulwark against the aggrandizement of government power vis à
vis the individual."15

11. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16–17
(1988) [hereinafter Gordon, The Independence].
12. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001) (rejecting a
federal statute that "exclude[d] from litigation those arguments and theories Congress finds
unacceptable but which by their nature are within the province of the courts to consider");
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 787 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Laws punishing
speech which protests the lawfulness or morality of the government’s own policy are the
essence of the tyrannical power the First Amendment guards against.").
13. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 22
(4th ed. 2010).
14. Robert W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law: Some
Critical Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 441, 448 (2010); see also FREEDMAN &
SMITH, supra note 13, at 22 ("Legal regulations and procedures are complicated and rapidly
changing; so that sophisticated, experienced agents who know their way around the rulesystems and the courts are generally essential to effective representation within and
operation of the system.").
15. James M. Fischer, External Control Over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 59, 97 (2006).
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Given the important nature of attorney advice, it may come as a
surprise to learn that the First Amendment protection afforded to this
category of speech is not clear.16 Some question whether it should be
protected at all.17 Indeed, most First Amendment doctrine addresses speech
intended for public consumption, while legal advice by definition entails
communication intended for private consumption by clients, who then
control its public dissemination.18 The Supreme Court has not directly
ruled on the matter.
This Article contends that attorney advice warrants First Amendment
protection subject to government limitations only in limited
circumstances.19 As even Justice O’Connor in writing for the majority in
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.20 acknowledged, "[t]here are circumstances
in which we will accord speech by attorneys on . . . matters of legal
representation the strongest protection our Constitution has to offer."21 It is
difficult to imagine a matter of legal representation more vital than the
advice a lawyer provides to a client.
16. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772 (1999) ("Despite the
century-old recognition of the regulation of professions, we still have . . . no paradigm for
the First Amendment rights of attorneys . . . when they communicate with their clients.");
see also W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 305
(2001) [hereinafter Wendel, Free Speech] ("One of the most important unanswered
questions in legal ethics is how the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression ought
to apply to the speech of attorneys . . . .").
17. Infra notes 253–54 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part III.C.3 (addressing the issue of attorney advice being confidential in
nature). I credit Peter Margulies for his suggestion in reviewing an early draft of this article
that this distinction be acknowledged at the outset, and for pointing out the counter-intuitive
cast, at least at first glance, that this may lend to arguments advanced herein.
19. For a similar argument, see Robert Post, KNOWING WHAT WE TALK ABOUT:
EXPERTISE, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 71 (2010) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Robert Post observes that "the First
Amendment is triggered because the value of democratic competence is at risk" when
legislation "seeks to politically override relevant professional standards of knowledge . . .
[or] when it requires professional experts to communicate knowledge that is professionally
regarded as false, or when it prohibits professional experts from communicating knowledge
that is professionally regarded as true." I am grateful to Robert Post for sharing his
unpublished manuscript where he makes a similar argument for First Amendment protection
of expert or professional knowledge based upon the value of what he terms "democratic
competence," though he would not necessarily go so far as to require strict scrutiny
protection.
20. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (upholding a thirty-day ban
on attorney direct-mail solicitation targeted to accident victims under the Central Hudson
test).
21. Id. at 634.
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A number of legal ethics scholars have addressed attorneys’ free
speech rights in circumstances such as advertising/solicitation, licensing,
statements to the press, and criticism of the judiciary, but none has focused
exclusively on the First Amendment protection deserved by an attorney’s
advice and, correspondingly, a client’s right to receive that advice. At
most, ethics scholars reference attorney advice in the larger context of
professional speech regulation, without a full exploration of the unique
obligations attorneys owe their clients or of the special role legal advice
plays in furthering the rule of law. Nor have academics in the field of
constitutional law given this topic the attention it deserves, though they
acknowledge that it presents an important and unresolved question within
First Amendment jurisprudence.
Attorney advice largely has been ignored by the legal academy, at least
in part, because advice is viewed as conduct—not speech—and because of
its inherently private nature.22 It also has not been a primary focus for
lawyer ethics or constitutional law scholars, perhaps, because legislative
bans on otherwise lawful legal advice seemed unlikely until recent years,23
particularly given the state courts’ traditional role in regulating lawyers.24
In the aftermath of recent congressional bans on legal advice as discussed in
Part II, scholars and the public are beginning to take notice and raising
questions about the First Amendment protection that attorney advice
deserves.25
22. See Volokh, Speech, supra note 2, at 1284 ("Most lawyers would likely agree that
[professional advice] generally should be unprotected, or at least less protected. A common
explanation for the Court’s lack of attention to these speech restrictions is that the speech is
actually conduct, which the First Amendment does not protect.").
23. See Renee Newman Knake, The Supreme Court’s Increased Attention to the Law
of Lawyering: Mere Coincidence or Something More?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1499, 1560–63
(2010) [hereinafter Knake, The Supreme Court’s] (noting increased federal and international
regulation of attorneys in recent years as a possible reason for significant number of
lawyering cases during Supreme Court’s 2009 term); see also James M. Fischer, External
Control Over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59, 97–98 (2006) (noting how
general consumer protection laws are now being applied to the lawyer-client relationship);
Schneyer, supra note 7, at 559 (endeavoring to depict the "shifting regulatory environment"
of the legal profession); Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession:
The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as "Service Providers," 2008 J. PROF’L LAWYER
189, 194 (2008) (discussing how viewing attorneys as "service providers" creates new
opportunities for regulation); Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, supra note 5, at 1389
(making note of reforms to the profession being proposed).
24. See Terry, supra note 23, at 205 (noting that the American Bar Association has
recently reaffirmed the traditional view that lawyers should be regulated by states’ judicial
branches).
25. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 580 (arguing that "[p]reventing lawyers
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Two cases taken up by the Court during the 2009 term involved
questions about the level of First Amendment protection, if any, warranted
for legal advice. The first case, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States (Milavetz),26 questioned the constitutionality of a federal statute that
prohibits attorneys from offering their clients legal advice regarding the
accumulation of debt in contemplation of filing for bankruptcy.27 The
second case, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP),28 involved
federal law that criminalizes material support, including legal advice, given
to foreign terrorist organizations even if for lawful, humanitarian
purposes.29 These cases offer striking instances of legislative limitations on
legal advice as a mechanism for controlling the behavior of those most in
need of a lawyer’s assistance.
Part II of this Article opens with analysis of the attorney advice bans in
Milavetz and HLP. These cases serve as keen examples for identifying the
problematic consequences that potentially may flow from legislative limits
on legal advice, though neither directly addressed the First Amendment’s
application to the advice of attorneys generally. Part III then turns to a
reframing of attorney speech precedent from other contexts and an
assessment of relevant constitutional theory to support the conclusion that
attorney advice deserves strong protection.30 This Part also includes a
discussion of attorneys’ ethical obligations and professional duties, in an
effort to demonstrate that while it may be appropriate to regulate some
forms of attorney speech, the narrow category of attorney advice is
particularly deserving of protection from unnecessary and unjustified
government constraint. Part IV concludes with reflections about the
circumstances in which attorney advice may be constitutionally
from giving important, lawful information to their clients cannot be reconciled with the First
Amendment").
26. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010).
27. See id. at 1329 ("[W]e must . . . consider whether the Act’s provisions governing
debt relief agencies’ advice to clients . . . violate[s] the First Amendment rights of
attorneys.").
28. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 (2010).
29. See id. at 2717 (discussing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996).
30. This Article does not attempt a comprehensive review of relevant First
Amendment theory, instead highlighting only those components related specifically to
understanding whether and how attorney advice should be accorded free speech protection.
It is notable, however, that articulating a functional, comprehensive theory of First
Amendment protection for attorney speech has proven rather elusive for those who have
attempted the endeavor, as they readily admit. See supra note 16 and accompanying text
(noting how the issue of First Amendment rights of attorneys is still unresolved).
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constrained. It is important, at the outset, to be clear about what this Article
attempts and what it leaves for another day. The Article is intended to be
primarily descriptive in nature. By this I mean that the Article lays out the
landscape of constitutional protection for legal advice as it currently exists,
at least to the extent such protection can be grounded in Supreme Court
precedent. The conclusion, however, is both descriptive and normative, in
that this Article reveals ways that the existing landscape indeed supports
strong free speech protection for legal advice rendered by an attorney to her
client.31
II. Recent Legislative Constraints on Attorney Advice
To fully appreciate the concerns raised by legislative constraints on
legal advice, it is helpful to begin with recent examples. The Milavetz and
HLP cases illustrate in compelling ways why attorney advice warrants
strong First Amendment protection. Both cases involved federal laws—one
a bankruptcy statute32 and the other an anti-terrorism statute33—designed to
restrict the nature of advice that attorneys render to their clients and to the
public. Though neither opinion directly confronted the question of whether
the First Amendment protects attorney advice, both decisions assist in
understanding the problematic consequences of legislative limits on legal
advice.
A. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States
It is telling that the Supreme Court’s first encounter with a federal ban
on attorney advice appeared in a bankruptcy statute. Over fifteen years ago,
in writing on the problems inherent in forbidding legal advice about activity
prohibited by law while simultaneously expressly contemplated (if not
encouraged) by way of the law’s enforcement, Professor Pepper observed:
31. One important observation implicit in this Article’s premise is the difference a
lawyer makes when legal advice is rendered. In a work-in-progress companion piece, The
Difference a Lawyer Makes, I explore the justifications for and consequences of treating
advice about the law from a lawyer differently than from a layperson.
32. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1329
(2010) (involving issues surrounding the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act).
33. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 (2010)
(involving issues surrounding the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996).
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Perhaps the example of bankruptcy makes the point most forcefully.
What is bankruptcy law other than an elaborate set of procedures
dealing with both the enforcement and the extinguishment of debt? If
discussion and explanation of these procedures and their consequences
is out of bounds for the lawyer, bankruptcy law could not function as
intended.34

The Court took up this issue during the 2009 term in a case called Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States,35 though the Court was not
necessarily persuaded by Professor Pepper’s position. The case involved an
attorney’s constitutional right to give advice and a client’s right to receive
that advice, and challenged a provision of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).36 Congress enacted the
BAPCPA in response to abuse and fraud within the bankruptcy system,
targeting both debtors and attorneys in order to thwart such practices,
though its enactment was controversial, largely due to the lobbying
influences of national consumer credit providers.37 Included in the many
changes ushered in by the BAPCPA are regulations applicable to "debt
relief agencies," a term that includes attorneys.38 These regulations include
a ban on legal guidance about incurring more debt before declaring
bankruptcy.39 The BAPCPA establishes significant penalties for attorneys
34. Pepper, supra note 6, at 1566.
35. See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1341 (declining to find the BAPCA’s restriction on
attorney advice in violation of the First Amendment).
36. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). The Milavetz plaintiffs also
challenged a provision of the BAPCPA that required the following disclosure in any
advertising by an attorney offering bankruptcy services: "We are a debt relief agency. We
help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code." 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(4).
The Supreme Court upheld the mandatory disclosure. See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1341–42
(finding the mandatory disclosure appropriate).
37. According to the legislative record, a primary purpose of the BAPCPA is to
address "misconduct by attorneys and other professionals" and "abusive practices by
consumer debtors who, for example, knowingly load up with credit card purchases or
recklessly obtain cash advances and then file for bankruptcy relief." H.R. Rep. No. 109-31,
at 5, 15 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 92, 101. But see Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt
and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
605, 688–89 (2008) (noting the influence of national consumer credit providers, including
the investment of more than $40 million in lobbying efforts).
38. The BAPCPA defines the term "debt relief agency" as "any person who provides
any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other
valuable consideration." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A).
39. The BAPCPA provides in pertinent part that "[a] debt relief agency shall not—
advise an assisted person or prospective assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation
of such person filing [for bankruptcy]." 11 U.S.C. § 526 (a)(4).
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who violate this advice ban, including civil damages and enforcement
actions by government officials.40
The Milavetz plaintiffs, including two lawyers, their law firm, and two
clients, argued that the BAPCPA ban prevents lawful advice, such as
recommending the refinance of a home mortgage before filing for
bankruptcy to take advantage of a lower interest rate or to extend the time
period for paying off the loan.41 As a content-based limitation on speech,
the plaintiffs maintained that the statutory restriction be struck down under
42
the First Amendment. Moreover, they claimed that the congressional ban
undermines an attorney’s responsibility to render competent, independent,
and candid advice.43 In defense, the Government suggested that the
regulation merely forbids unlawful advice, for example, counseling a client
to take out new loans with the intent to abuse the process knowing that the
debt soon will be wiped clean.44 The only advice that Congress intended to
ban, according to the Government, is advice designed to subvert the
45
A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit held that the
bankruptcy law.
advice ban was "unconstitutionally overbroad"46 in that it prohibited not
only unlawful advice (as the government maintained) but also "advice
constituting prudent prebankruptcy planning that is not an attempt to

40. See id. § 526(c)(3) (listing various penalties for violations of the section).
41. See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1338 n.6 (mentioning a hypothetical posited by the
plaintiffs regarding advice to refinance a mortgage or purchase a reliable car prior to filing
for bankruptcy).
42. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 792 (8th
Cir. 2008) ("Plaintiffs assert that the prohibition against advising an assisted person or
prospective assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation of bankruptcy violates the
First Amendment."). Plaintiffs argued that the restriction should be viewed under strict
scrutiny, which requires the government to demonstrate a compelling interest in regulating
the speech at issue and that the least restrictive means possible are employed. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 793 (summarizing the Government’s interpretation of the section). The
court observed:
According to the government, [this section] should be interpreted as merely
preventing an attorney from advising [a debtor-client] to take on more debt in
contemplation of bankruptcy when the incurrence of such debt is done with the
intent to manipulate the bankruptcy system, engage in abusive conduct, or take
unfair advantage of the bankruptcy discharge.
Id.
45. See id. (summarizing the Government’s position that the statute is only meant to
cover advice to take on more debt in anticipation of bankruptcy, thereby taking advantage of
the bankruptcy system).
46. Id. at 788.
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circumvent, abuse, or undermine the bankruptcy laws."47 The Eighth
Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs’ arguments about the advice ban’s
prohibition on prudent (and lawful) prebankruptcy planning, as well as the
impact of the ban in "prevent[ing] attorneys from fulfilling their duty to
clients to give them appropriate and beneficial advice."48
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s finding of
49
The Court chose a more
overbreadth with respect to the advice ban.
limited construction of the statute, without "adopt[ing] precisely the view
50
The Court read the statute to cover "a
the Government advocates."
specific type of misconduct designed to manipulate the protections of the
bankruptcy system" and concluded that the statute prohibits an attorney
only from "advising a debtor to incur more debt because the debtor is filing
for bankruptcy, rather than for a valid purpose."51
To justify a narrowed construction of the bankruptcy advice ban, the
Court referred to requirements of American Bar Association Model Rule of
Professional Conduct (ABA Model Rule) 1.2(d), which prohibits an
attorney from endorsing or participating in a client’s crime or fraud, but at
the same time allows an attorney to advise a client, when appropriate, about
legal strategies for testing or challenging a law.52 In doing so, the Court in
essence determined that the federal statute could not be construed to
conflict with the Model Rule.53 Not only did this narrowing construction
give a rule promulgated by a private organization of lawyers an interesting
amount of authority for ascertaining the meaning of a federal law enacted
by Congress, but this construction renders the federal law largely

47. Id. at 793.
48. Id.
49. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1334
(2010) ("Characterizing the statute as a broad, content-based restriction on attorney-client
communications that is not adequately tailored . . . the Eighth Circuit found the rule
substantially overbroad . . . . [W]e reject that conclusion.").
50. Id. at 1335.
51. Id. at 1336.
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2010) ("A lawyer shall not
counsel a client to engage . . . in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,
but . . . may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct . . . and may
counsel or assist a client . . . to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
law.").
53. See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1337–38 (citing Model Rule 1.2(d) as support for its
conclusion that § 526(a)(4) does not prohibit "frank discussion" between lawyers and clients
about incurring additional debt).
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unnecessary.54 The Court declined, notably, to "consider whether the
statute so construed withstands First Amendment scrutiny."55
B. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
The Supreme Court considered another federal constraint on attorney
advice in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.56 The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)57 and its amendment, the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA),58 criminalize
"expert advice or assistance"59 provided to a group classified as "a foreign
terrorist organization."60 This is the case even if the expert advice or
54. See id. at 1337 ("In context, § 526(a)(4) is best understood to provide an
additional safeguard against the practice of loading up on debt prior to filing." (emphasis
added)). Indeed, Model Rule 1.2 has been the basis for attorney discipline in bankruptcy
advice-giving. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 849 A.2d 423, 443–44
(Md. 2004) (disbarring attorney in part based upon Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct
1.2 violation for advising client to obtain credit card loans in order to pay legal fees with the
intent of having the debt discharged in bankruptcy and giving the client a credit card
application, assisting in the fraud). For further discussion of Model Rule 1.2, see infra notes
298–316 and accompanying text.
55. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339. Justice Sotomayor noted, however, that "it is hard to
see how a rule that narrowly prohibits an attorney from affirmatively advising a client to
commit this type of abusive prefiling conduct could chill attorney speech or inhibit the
attorney-client relationship." Id. at 1338.
56. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010)
(rejecting plaintiffs’ claims that a statute criminalizing the provision of "material support" to
terrorist organizations was unconstitutionally vague or restrictive of plaintiffs’ right of free
speech and association).
57. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104132, § 303, 110 Stat. 1214, 1250 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2006))
(criminalizing the knowing provision of "material support or resources" to foreign terrorist
organizations); see also Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L.
No. 107-56, § 805(a)(2)(b), 115 Stat. 272, 377 (adding "expert advice or assistance" to the
list of acts criminalized by AEDPA).
58. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108458, § 6603, 2004 Stat. 3762, 3763 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2006)) (amending
AEDPA by including "services" in the definition of "material support or resources" and
requiring that a person have knowledge that his or her support was going to a terrorist
organization).
59. Id. § 2339(A)(b)(2)–(3).
60. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of State to designate a
group as a foreign terrorist organization). At the time of this writing, forty-six organizations
were designated as foreign terrorist organizations. See Terrorist Exclusion List, OFFICE FOR
THE COORDINATOR OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.
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assistance relates to activities that are lawful and nonviolent.61 The term
"expert advice or assistance" is defined by statute as "scientific, technical,
62
or other specialized knowledge," and this is understood to include legal
63
knowledge.
The AEDPA/IRTPA prohibition on "expert advice or assistance" was
attacked by the human rights organization Humanitarian Law Project,
retired administrative law judge Ralph Fertig,64 physician Nagalingam
Jeyalingam, and several nonprofit organizations serving persons of Tamil
65
descent. The plaintiffs desired to provide expert advice and assistance to
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam for
"only the lawful, nonviolent purposes of those groups."66 This advice and
assistance included "offer[ing] legal expertise in negotiating peace
agreements,"67 though, significantly, the plaintiffs sought the right to
provide this support outside the lawyer-client relationship. Nevertheless, at
oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, the Government contended that
amicus curiae advocacy (and presumably advice) on behalf of a terrorist
organization would violate the statute.68 The Ninth Circuit held that the
state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (identifying designated
terrorist organizations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2009)
(noting Government attorneys conceded at oral argument that filing an amicus brief on
behalf of a terrorist organization would amount to giving "expert advice or assistance").
62. 8 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) (2006).
63. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2010)
("Plaintiffs’ activities [providing legal advice] fall comfortably within the scope of ‘expert
advice or assistance.’").
64. Judge Fertig was not seeking to provide legal advice in the context of an attorneyclient relationship with a foreign terrorist organization. Rather, the plaintiffs sought a right
to offer advice or assistance generally and, significantly, presented no argument related to
the unique attributes of advice offered in the attorney-client relationship. See Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 49, Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir.
2006) (Nos. 05-56753, 05-56846), 2006 WL 2427533 ("Plaintiffs seek to provide advice and
assistance on tsunami relief work, human rights advocacy, peacemaking, economic
development, Tamil language, literature, cultural heritage, and history, among other
things.").
65. See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2712 (listing the plaintiffs in HLP).
66. Id. The plaintiffs challenged several additional provisions of the AEDPA/IRTPA
not relevant here, and also raised due process concerns under the Fifth Amendment—all
important aspects of the case but beyond the scope of this article. Id. at 2718–22.
67. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 921 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).
68. See id. at 930 ("At oral argument, the government stated that filing an amicus brief
in support of a foreign terrorist organization would violate [the] prohibition against
providing ‘expert advice or assistance.’"). It should be noted that others argued such activity
would not fall within the AEDPA/IRTPA prohibition’s ambit. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus

654

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639 (2011)

"other specialized knowledge" portion of the prohibition on "expert advice
or assistance" language was void for vagueness as applied because it
"cover[s] constitutionally protected advocacy."69 The court did not directly
address the question of the statute’s application to legal advice.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s finding of vagueness
in a 6-3 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts.70 The Court declined,
however, to adopt "the extreme positions" taken by both sides.71 Attorney
General Holder had argued that the provisions are not vague and, "in any
event . . . regulate[] conduct, not speech, and do[] not violate the First
Amendment."72 The Humanitarian Law Project plaintiffs had argued that
the proposed assistance involved political speech—for example, speech "to
lobby Congress, to teach and advise on human rights, to promote peaceful
resolution of political disputes, and to advocate for the human rights of
minority populations"—that deserves "the First Amendment’s highest
Curiae Scholars, Attorneys, and Former Public Officials with Experience in TerrorismRelated Issues In Support of Petitioners at 26 n.9, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
(HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 5070069 ("The government
was incorrect in arguing below that submitting an amicus brief on a DFTO’s behalf would
be prohibited as ‘expert advice or assistance’ under the statute."). The amici curiae also took
the position that legal advice is allowed under federal regulations implementing the statute.
See id. at 26 ("Regulations [under 31 C.F.R. § 597.505 (a) (2010)] allow an attorney to
provide advice to a DFTO on compliance with applicable United States law.").
Nevertheless, at oral argument before the Supreme Court, Solicitor General Elena Kagan
maintained the Government’s position that the statute bars advocacy such as the filing of an
amicus brief, though she did observe that "to the extent there is any constitutional claim that
they would be entitled to representation, . . . the government believes that the statute should
be read so as not to include that." Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, 51, Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89).
Presumably, the related legal advice rendered to the amicus client also would be barred.
This article leaves for another day a detailed analysis of the constitutionality of 31 C.F.R.
§ 597.50. For a discussion of federal regulations requiring attorneys to obtain a license
before assisting a client, see generally Jill M. Troxel, Note, Office of Foreign Assets Control
Regulations: Making Attorneys Choose Between Compliance and the Attorney-Client
Relationship, 24 REV. LITIG. 637 (2009).
69. Mukasey, 522 F.3d at 930. The court observed that "[w]hile due process does not
require impossible standards of clarity, the requirement for clarity is enhanced when
criminal sanctions are at issue or when the statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First
Amendment freedoms." Id. at 928 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2010)
(rejecting plaintiffs’ claims that the language in AEDPA was unconstitutionally vague
because "the statutory terms are clear in their application to plaintiffs’ proposed conduct,"
even under the "heightened standard" applied by the Ninth Circuit).
71. Id. at 2722.
72. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP),
130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 1567496.
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protection."73 Instead, Justice Roberts explained, "[t]he law here may be
described as directed at conduct . . . but as applied to plaintiffs the conduct
triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a
message."74
Applying what Justice Roberts called a "more demanding standard"75
of scrutiny—though not necessarily strict scrutiny, as noted by the
76
dissent —the majority upheld the ban as applied to plaintiffs in two
narrow circumstances. First, Congress may bar training about the use of
humanitarian and international law to facilitate peaceful dispute
resolution.77 Second, Congress may bar teaching about how to petition
various representative bodies like the United Nations.78 The Court cloaked
79
the decision in terms of national security, citing Congress’s "specific
findings regarding the serious threat posed by international terrorism" and
the Executive Branch’s conclusion in an affidavit that "the experience and
analysis of the U.S. government agencies charged with combating terrorism
73. Opening Brief of Humanitarian Law Project at 23, Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (Nos. 8-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 3865433.
74. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
75. Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)).
76. The dissent would have applied strict scrutiny and noted that the majority’s
formulation appeared to stop short of that standard. See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2734 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing a proper review would "determine whether the prohibition is justified by
a compelling need that cannot be less restrictively accommodated"). Commentators have
speculated on whether the majority intended to create a new level of scrutiny when national
security or war-on-terrorism concerns are involved.
See, e.g., Eugene Volokh,
Humanitarian Law Project and Strict Scrutiny, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (June 21, 2010,
1:28 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/21/humanitarian-law-project-and-strict-scrutiny/ (last
visited Mar. 27, 2011) (suggesting the Court will uphold as a "compelling interest" under
strict scrutiny many content-based restrictions on speech directly or indirectly aiding
terrorist organizations, so long as the restriction does not go so far as to criminalize
independent advocacy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
77. See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2724 (majority opinion) (concluding § 2339B bars
individuals from lending "special skills" or "specialized knowledge" to a DFTO’s
international legal and diplomatic efforts). It is also possible that engaging in political
advocacy on behalf of groups like the Kurds and the Tamil Tigers would violate the law as
well, but the majority found that the proposed advocacy was "phrased at such a high level of
generality that [the plaintiffs] cannot prevail in this preenforcement challenge." Id. at 2722.
78. See id. ("[A]dvice on petitioning the United Nations . . . is barred."). The Court
found, however, that plaintiffs themselves "may advocate before the United Nations." Id. at
2723.
79. See id. at 2711 ("Given the sensitive interests in national security and foreign
affairs at stake, the political branches have adequately substantiated their determination that
prohibiting material support . . . serves the Government’s interest in preventing terrorism,
even if . . . the support promote[s] only the groups’ nonviolent ends.").
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strongly support Congress’s finding that all contributions to foreign terrorist
organizations further their terrorism."80 In dicta, the Chief Justice observed
that the outcome of HLP should not be read as holding that "any future
applications of the material-support statute to speech or advocacy will
survive First Amendment scrutiny."81 He forecasted that "more difficult
82
cases . . . may arise under the statute in the future." The application of the
statute to the advice rendered by an attorney to her client certainly presents
one of Chief Justice Roberts’s "more difficult cases," and Justice
Sotomayor’s express reservation in Milavetz of any First Amendment
application to the bankruptcy ban83 may very well have been made with this
in mind.84
So it may be that when confronted with the specific question about the
degree to which an attorney’s legal advice to a foreign terrorist organization
is constitutionally banned, the Court will reach a different conclusion.
Indeed, under the reasoning of Milavetz, the ban in HLP must be read
consistent with ABA Model Rule 1.2(d), which would permit an attorney’s
advice about the use of humanitarian and international law to peacefully
resolve disputes and advice about how to petition representative bodies like
the United Nations.85 Until the Court directly addresses the statute’s
application in the context of the attorney-client relationship, however, the
outcome of HLP is likely to have a chilling effect on attorney advice,
particularly to the extent it relates to facilitating peaceful dispute resolution
or petitioning representative bodies like the United Nations.86
Like Milavetz, the outcome of HLP does not provide definitive
guidance on the First Amendment’s application to attorney advice. But
both cases illustrate the serious concerns presented when Congress
80. Id. at 2710 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 2730.
82. Id.
83. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339
(2010) (declining to conduct a full analysis of whether § 526(a)(4) of BAPCPA would
"withstand[] First Amendment scrutiny").
84. See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2716–17 (clarifying that the Court’s review did not include
legal advice).
85. For further discussion of ABA Model Rule 1.2(d), see infra notes 294–312 and
accompanying text.
86. See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("It is inordinately difficult to
distinguish when speech activity will and when it will not initiate the chain of causation the
Court suggests . . . . Even were we to find some such line of distinction, its application
would seem so inherently uncertain that it would often, perhaps always, ‘chill’ protected
speech . . . .").
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responds to controversial and high-profile matters (such as bankruptcy
abuse and terrorism prevention) with piecemeal bans on legal advice that
largely appear to be political responses.87 As the Supreme Court observed
in an early attorney speech case,
[w]e have . . . repeatedly held that laws which actually affect the
exercise of [free speech] rights cannot be sustained merely because they
were enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within the
[legislature’s] competence, or even because the laws do in fact provide a
helpful means of dealing with such an evil.88

C. Other Constraints on Advice
The outcomes of Milavetz and HLP hold significant implications not
only for individuals and groups seeking guidance about bankruptcy or
peace-making activities, but also for those desiring advice about any other
area of law where Congress may decide to legislate away the attorney’s
ability to advise her client and the client’s right to receive that advice.89
Allowing the bans on attorney advice in the bankruptcy and anti-terrorism
statutes to stand makes it more probable that legislative interference in the
advice attorneys give to their clients will continue.90 In the wake of
87. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 538 (2004) (observing that during
wartime "[t]oo often . . . [Congress] has either failed to exercise a check on public hysteria
or, in some instances, moved far beyond anything the public demanded").
88. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222
(1967).
89. See, e.g., Carolyn B. Lamm, Memo to Washington: Hands Off Lawyers,
Piecemeal Federal Laws and Rules Threaten to Undermine State Judicial Branch
Regulation of the Profession, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 2009, at 62 (discussing the consequences
of congressional involvement in lawyer regulation and criticizing federal laws that
"incorrectly identify lawyers and other professionals" as "creditors" or "debt relief agencies"
or "providers of financial products or services" as "interfer[ing] with the states’ rights to
regulate lawyers and protect consumers of legal services").
90. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., A Debt-Defying Act: Courts Say Part of Embattled
Bankruptcy Law Violates First Amendment, J. AMER. BAR ASS’N, Jan. 2009 (explaining the
ban). This article quotes Joseph R. Prochaska, immediate-past chair of the Consumer
Bankruptcy Committee in the ABA Section of Business Law, as stating that cases like
Milavetz "could have a spillover outside the bankruptcy context. . . . For example, Congress
could apply the same rationale to the tax arena and start to regulate the content of advice that
tax attorneys give to clients about lawful ways to minimize tax liabilities." Id.; see also
Judith L. Maute, Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation Rules Under Commercial
Speech and Antitrust Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 487 (1986) (observing that,
until the mid-1980s, "federal intrusions on autonomous self-regulation by state bar
associations were rare" and attributing the intervention of federal regulation to "[t]he
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Milavetz and HLP, future Congressional and state legislative restraint of
attorney advice is foreseeable (if not a foregone certainty).91 Consider, as
92
just one example, the National Defense Authorization for FY2011,
which requires the Department of Defense to "conduct an investigation of
the conduct and the practices of lawyers" who represented detainees held
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and "interfered with the operations of the
Department of Defense," among other things.93 Though not an outright
advice ban, this provision is likely to have a chilling effect on attorney
94
Other examples of federal legislative efforts potentially
advice.
impacting the attorney-client relationship include the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act,95 federal anti-money laundering statutes,96 and the Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed by the House of
Representatives in December 2009 (though subsequently modified to
exclude lawyers, in large part due to efforts by the American Bar
97
Similar concerns are raised where federal and state law
Association).
Supreme Court’s decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar . . . [as] signal[ing] the end of
this unbridled, autonomous self-regulation").
91. See, e.g., James M. Fischer, External Control Over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 59, 97 (2006) (discussing increased state and federal legislative control over
lawyers and observing that while "[t]o date, legislatures have yet to consistently or
significantly intrude into the field of lawyer regulation[,] [i]nroads are . . . visible and once
the path is established it becomes ever easier to take the path again").
92. H.R. Res. 5136, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).
93. Id. § 1037(A).
94. See Steve Vladeck, The War on Lawyers, Continued . . ., BALKINIZATION (May 25,
2010), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/05/war-on-lawyers-continued.html (last visited Mar.
27, 2011) ("Even if this provision doesn’t directly constrain the ability of Guantanamo
lawyers to advocate on behalf of their clients, the serious chilling effect that it likely will
have, especially at the margins, seems to raise the same concerns identified by the Velazquez
Court.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
95. For a discussion of the ways Congress controls lawyers under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, see Lewis D. Lowenfels et al., Attorneys as Gatekeepers: SEC Actions Against
Lawyers in the Age of Sarbanes-Oxley, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 877, 878, 929 (2006) (observing
that "[t]he ushering in of what appears to be a new era of the SEC as an active and
enthusiastic proponent of the attorney’s ‘gatekeeping’ role raises serious questions").
Lowenfels also cites evidence that "the sheer number of SEC actions against lawyers" in the
wake of the new regulation "has increased dramatically." Id.
96. See, e.g., Howard W. Goldstein, Debate Over Lawyers’ Role in Anti-Money
Laundering Enforcement, CORP. COUNS., June 6, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/
jsp/cc/PubArticleFriendlyCC.jsp?id=1202421954660 (discussing criminal liability for
lawyers compliant in money laundering schemes and attempts to implement reporting
requirements for lawyers who suspect their clients of money laundering).
97. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (providing the Act); see also Carolyn
B. Lamm, ABA President Lamm Statement re: "Exclusion for the Practice of Law" in
"Dodd-Frank Act of 2010," (June 26, 2010), http://www.abanow.org/2010/06/aba-president-
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conflict, for example in the case of states authorizing distribution of
marijuana for medical purposes while the practice remains illegal under
federal law.98 Again, while these examples are not explicit bans on legal
advice as seen in Milavetz or HLP, the practical effect of these federal and
state laws is to constrain legal advice. Constitutional concerns about these
kinds of constraints are addressed more fully below in Part IV.
III. Why Attorney Advice Warrants First Amendment Protection
The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."99 This protection is made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The speech of attorneys presents a conundrum for
the First Amendment.100 Kathleen Sullivan identified this dilemma more
than a decade ago, yet her description remains apt today:
On the one hand, lawyers are sometimes perceived as classic speakers in
public discourse, free of state control and entitled to all the ordinary
protections of speech and association available to other speakers. Indeed,
lamm-statement-re-exclusion-for-the-practice-of-law-in-dodd-frank-act-of-2010/ (last visited
Mar. 27, 2011) (explaining the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau established by
the Dodd-Frank Act of Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and its
effect on attorneys) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). President Lamm
notes that the bill creating the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau states that the bureau
"may not exercise any supervisory or enforcement authority with respect to an activity
engaged in by an attorney as part of the practice of law under the laws of a State in which the
attorney is licensed to practice law." Id. For an example of an earlier federal statutory
constraint on legal advice, see J. Matthew Miller, Note, Balancing the Budget on the Backs
of America’s Elderly—Section 4734 of the Balanced Budget Act: Criminalization of the
Attorney’s Role as Advisor and Counselor, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 165, 197 (1998) (arguing
that § 4734 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 unconstitutionally prohibited attorneys from
counseling elderly clients about legal actions regarding Medicaid issues); see also Magee v.
United States, 93 F. Supp. 2d 161, 162 (D.R.I. 2000) (recognizing unconstitutionality of
Medicaid statute prohibiting certain legal advice); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n v. Reno, 999 F.
Supp. 710, 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (issuing preliminary injunction based on arguments that
Medicaid statute violated attorneys’ First Amendment rights to render legal advice).
98. See infra notes 308–11 and accompanying text (discussing the example of attorney
advice on the issue of medical marijuana).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
100. See, e.g., Note, Attorneys’ Rights Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Free Speech, Right to Know, and Freedom of Association, 1977 WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 694–
705 (1977) (discussing conflicts between free speech rights and professional obligations of
attorneys).
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in light of their frequent role as representatives of underdogs and
challengers to the state and the status quo, lawyers may be perceived to be
entitled to extraordinary speech protections. On the other hand, lawyers
are sometimes thought of as delegates of state power—officers of the
court and professional licensees whose special privileges are conditioned
upon foregoing some speech rights that others enjoy.101

The dichotomy of interests has led, as Brad Wendel concludes, to a body of
"decisions by courts considering free speech arguments by lawyers [that] are
surprisingly out of touch with the mainstream of constitutional law."102 Over
the years, the Supreme Court has addressed the intersections between
attorney regulation and the First Amendment in a number of circumstances
such as advertising,103 solicitation,104 statements to the press,105 bar admission
101. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession:
Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569 (1998).
102. Wendel, Free Speech, supra note 16, at 312. See generally Maute, supra note 91
(discussing the significance of the Supreme Court’s decision to scrutinize anticompetitive
regulation of attorney advertising and solicitation under the commercial speech doctrine rather
than under antitrust laws). Professor Maute notes that the Court’s "case-by-case adjudication" of
the post-Bates lawyer advertising and solicitation cases, while "allow[ing] the Court to carefully
delineate permissible types of regulation, . . . does little to create a cogent system of evaluating all
types of commercial speech" and that "this ad hoc approach is creating doctrinal confusion and
multiple tiers of scrutiny for commercial and other forms of protected speech." Id. at 501–02.
103. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (applying First Amendment
commercial speech protection to lawyer advertising); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203–04 (1982)
(same); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990)
(same); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 627 (1985) (holding that
disciplinary rules could mandate disclosure regarding payment of costs in advertisement, but that
First Amendment protected attorneys so long as the advertisement is truthful and nondeceptive);
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340–41 (2010) (applying
Zauderer to uphold mandated disclosure in advertising by lawyers for bankruptcy-related
services).
104. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (holding that activities of NAACP
were modes of expression and association which were protected by First and Fourteenth
Amendments, and Virginia could not prohibit under its power to regulate legal profession as
improper solicitation of legal business in violation of Virginia statute and canons of professional
ethics); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that an injunction
restraining brotherhood from maintaining and carrying out plan for advising injured workers to
obtain legal advice and for recommending specific lawyers denied members rights guaranteed by
First and Fourteenth Amendments); United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n,
389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (same); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971) (same); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (same); In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412, 434 (1978) (same); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (holding
that categorical ban on direct-mail solicitation targeting potential clients with specific legal claims
violates First Amendment); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (holding that a
thirty-day prohibition on direct mail solicitation by lawyers of personal injury or wrongful death
clients withstood First Amendment scrutiny).
105. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (invalidating a Louisiana statute
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and licensing,106 government attorneys,107 and fee limits.108 Academics
and commentators have taken up these109 and other free speech
imposing criminal liability for criticism of official conduct of public officials); see also Gentile v.
State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1058 (1991) (extending First Amendment protections to
extrajudicial speech by an attorney).
106. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 636 (1959) (reversing a suspension order based upon
protected speech); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Ca., 366 U.S. 36, 49–52 (1961) (employing a
"balancing test" to weigh First Amendment interests against state interests in denying bar
membership to applicant for refusing to answer questions about Communist Party affiliation); In
re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 89–90 (1961) (same); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990)
(requiring California state bar to show challenged expenditures made with bar dues "necessarily
or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality
of legal service"); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
166 (1971) (upholding a New York character and fitness questionnaire as constitutionally valid).
107. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (using a balancing test in
determining a public employee’s rights of free speech); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421
(2006) (same).
108. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 334–35 (1985)
(finding no First Amendment violation in federal statute capping fee paid to an attorney
representing a veteran before the Veterans Administration).
109. See, e.g., Ben C. Adams, Edward H. Benton, David A. Beyer & Charles H. Coffin,
Special Project, Admission to the Bar: A Constitutional Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REV. 655, 683–92
(1981) (discussing First Amendment concerns inherent in moral character requirement for bar
admission); Stephen A. Bailey, Fooling Ourselves? An Ethical and Constitutional Analysis of
Lawyer-to-Lawyer Advertising, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 385, 382–92 (2009) (discussing
changes to Florida regulations tightening restrictions on speech between attorneys); Ralph H.
Brock, "This Court Took a Wrong Turn with Bates:" Why the Supreme Court Should Revisit
Lawyer Advertising, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 145, 148 (2009) (discussing how legal
advertising may be regulated consistent with the First Amendment); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., "May It
Please the Camera, . . . I Mean the Court"—an Intrajudicial Solution to an Extrajudicial
Problem, 39 GA. L. REV. 83, 94–122 (2004) (discussing First Amendment rights of attorneys in
relation to statements to the media); R. Michael Cassidy, The Prosecutor and the Press: Lessons
(Not) Learned from the Mike Nifong Debacle, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2008, at 67, 71–
79 (discussing First Amendment rights of attorneys relating to statements to the media); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First Amendment, 47
EMORY L.J. 859, 859–87 (1998) (discussing First Amendment and attorney statements to the
press); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Russell G. Pearce & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Why Lawyers Should Be
Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1084–87
(1983) (discussing First Amendment’s application to lawyer advertising); Robert Kry, The
Watchman for Truth: Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U.L. REV.
885, 891–97 (2002) (discussing constitutional objections to restraints on professional speech
based on free speech); Maute, supra note 91, at 515–20 (discussing First Amendment’s
application to lawyer advertising); Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyer Advertising and the Philosophical
Origins of Commercial Speech Doctrine, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 91, 97–99 (2002) (describing the
interplay between electronic media regulation relating to advertisements for legal services and
First Amendment protections of lawyers’ speech); Carla Pratt, Should a Klansman be a Lawyer?
Racism as an Ethical Barrier to the Legal Profession, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 857, 867–77 (2003)
(discussing First Amendment concerns in moral character requirement for bar admission); Ronald
D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free Speech in the Wake of Florida Bar v.
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considerations for attorneys, some attempting a comprehensive
treatment110 with others focusing on narrow topics like criticism of the
judiciary,111 racist/hate speech,112 whistle-blowing,113 judicial speech,114
Went For It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REV. 703, 732–36 (1997) (discussing the implications of free speech
restrictions designed to maintain the professionalism of attorneys); Deborah Rhode, Moral
Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L. J. 491, 566–70 (1985) (discussing First
Amendment concerns in moral character requirement for bar admission); Victor Streib, Media
Misuse: Criminal Lawyer Advertising and Prosecutor Campaigning Under the Guise of the
Public’s Need to Know, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 703, 703–04 (2008) (noting several scholars have
addressed the issue of free speech in relation to attorneys’ statements to the press); John J.
Watkins, Lawyer Advertising, the Electronic Media, and the First Amendment, 49 ARK. L. REV.
739, 749–61 (1997) (describing the interplay between electronic media regulation relating to
advertisements for legal services and First Amendment protections of lawyers’ speech); see also
Kevin Cole & Fred C. Zacharias, The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer Speech, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1627, 1637–47 (1996) (discussing the regulation of attorneys’ extrajudicial speech to
the press without reaching the First Amendment issues).
110. See, e.g., Schauer, The Speech, supra note 5, at 688 (describing law as a "speechconstituted activity"); Sullivan, supra note 101, at 570–80 (discussing the multifarious restrictions
on lawyers’ speech); Wendel, Free Speech, supra note 16, at 307 (offering a thorough study of
"how the regulation of lawyers’ speech fits within the various doctrinal complexities that
characterize First Amendment law and within the ethical norms that govern the practice of law").
111. See, e.g., Terri R. Day, Speak No Evil: Legal Ethics v. the First Amendment, 32 J.
LEGAL PROF. 161, 161 (2008) (noting that "[t]he extent that attorneys may enter the debate [about
the role of judges] is controversial"); Lawrence A. Dubin, Fieger, Civility and the First
Amendment: Should the Mouth That Roared Be Silenced?, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 377, 396
(2005) (advocating for greater protection of speech criticizing the judiciary); Margaret Tarkington,
The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO.
L. J. 1567, 1575 (2009) (discussing First Amendment concerns and criticism of the judiciary);
Note, Attorney Discipline and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 922, 922 (1974)
(describing the conflict between an attorney’s right of free speech and the judicial interpretation of
ethical standards).
112. See, e.g., Andrew Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why
the First Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism, and Ethnic Bias in the Legal
Profession, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781, 785 (1996) (favoring an ethical rule restricting lawyers’
speech).
113. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within TwentyFirst-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1250–63 (2009) (discussing
concerns present when public and private sector attorneys are not protected for whistleblowing).
114. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Is It the Siren’s Call?: Judges and Free Speech While
Cases are Pending, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 831, 844 (1995) (discussing restraints on judicial speech
regarding cases before the court); Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to that Man Behind the
Robe: Judicial Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 301, 304 (2003) (noting the First Amendment implications of restricting speech relating to
judicial elections but not other elections); Stephen Gillers, "If Elected, I Promise [___]"—What
Should Judicial Candidates Be Allowed to Say, 35 IND. L. REV. 725, 725 (2002) (discussing First
Amendment and judicial speech restraints); Alan B. Morrison, The Judge Has No Robes:
Keeping the Electorate in the Dark About What Judges Think About the Issues, 36 IND. L. REV.
719, 730–40 (2003) (discussing the advisability of restricting speech of judicial candidates); Tobin
Sparling, Keeping up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the Model Code of Judicial
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online speech,115 and other related issues.116
Conversely, scant attention has been devoted to the degree of First
Amendment protection warranted by the advice from an attorney to her client.117
Conduct’s Prohibition of Extrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance of Bias, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 441, 466–74 (2006) (discussing how restrictions on judicial speech may withstand
constitutional scrutiny).
115. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Fountaine, When Is a Computer a Lawyer?: Interactive Legal
Software, Unauthorized Practice of Law, and the First Amendment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 147, 158–68
(2002) (describing First Amendment limitations on enforcement of bar regulations); James B.
Lake, Speaking Legally and Freely: Lawyers, Web Sites, and the First Amendment, 58 S.C. L.
REV. 871, 879–81 (2007) (concluding the First Amendment protects online speech from
onerous regulations); Anthony Ciolli, Note, Are Blogs Commercial Speech?, 58 S.C. L. REV.
725, 727–34 (2007) (discussing the difficulty in classifying, and thus regulating, attorney
online speech); Justin Krypel, Note, A New Frontier or Merely a New Medium? An Analysis
of the Ethics of Blawgs, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 457, 484–86 (2008) (discussing
the propriety of ethical restraints on attorney speech); Rachel C. Lee, Note, Ex Parte Blogging:
The Legal Ethics of Supreme Court Advocacy in the Internet Era, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1535,
1569–70 (2009) (advocating for greater regulation of online speech by attorneys).
116. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 857–909 (8th ed. 2009)
(discussing the free speech rights of lawyers and judicial candidates); Jona Goldschmidt,
Constitutional Issues in Courtroom Decorum, 31 HAM. L. REV. 1, 37–52 (2008) (describing
constitutional issues implicated by courtroom restrictions on speech); Robert R. Kuehn, A
Normative Analysis of the Rights and Duties of Law Professors to Speak Out, 55 S.C. L.
REV. 253, 256–57 (2003) (discussing whether attorneys have a right in exceptional cases to
reveal confidential information); Gary A. Muenneke, Dances with Wolves: A New
Perspective on Law Firm Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 585–614 (1992)
(examining the legality of state bar association rules that prohibit law firm diversification
under the federal antitrust laws and the First Amendment); Christopher J. Peters,
Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 705, 707–12 (2004)
(discussing the constitutionality of restrictions on adjudicative speech, i.e. "speech intended
to influence court decisions"); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 62 (1981) ("Unauthorized practice prohibitions plainly implicate first amendment
values by restricting both the lay speaker’s ability to convey information and the public’s
opportunities to receive it."); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment:
Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030, 1053–
56 (1995) (discussing ethical implications of speaking out against one’s client); Fred
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L.
REV. 601, 644–50 (1990) [hereinafter Zacharias, Rethinking] (discussing whether attorneys
have a right in exceptional cases to reveal confidential information); Maria Brooke Tusk,
Note, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1202,
1234 (2003) (concluding no-citation rules are an impermissible restraint on attorney speech).
117. A notable exception is a compelling treatment of constitutional protection for
commercial and professional speech by Daniel Halberstam. See Daniel Halberstam,
Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social
Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 777 (1999) (discussing "the common thread between
the Court’s approaches to commercial and professional speech in the hope of developing a
viable theory for the constitutional analysis of each" and "elaborat[ing] a constitutional
approach to both commercial and professional speech based on the social relationship
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To be clear, this Article is concerned solely with the advice that is protected by
attorney-client privilege (i.e. "a communication made between privileged persons
in confidence for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the
client"118). The Article’s coverage also includes advice that might not be
privileged but is still within the scope of ABA Model Rule 1.6’s protection for
confidential information (i.e. "a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client"119).
The Court has not squarely confronted the First Amendment
protection for speech of attorneys when they render advice. In the
handful of cases where the Court has examined the advice given by
professionals, such as physicians and financial advisors, none of the
decisions appreciate the special role of attorneys in the American legal
system. Those cases do, at least in part, lay the foundation for recognizing
legal advice as protected speech (an assumption that seems reasonable not
only in light of the discussion below but also given the Roberts Court’s
recent treatment of bans on advice, as explained above in the discussion of
Milavetz and HLP120).
Yet, we should not assume that the Court will necessarily conclude
that attorney advice is subject to free speech protection. The questions that
necessarily follow, then, are whether legal advice is protected under the
First Amendment and, if so, under what circumstances may the government
constitutionally restrict advice rendered by an attorney? To answer these
questions, the relevant Supreme Court precedent involving attorney speech
as well as the free speech value of attorney advice must be assessed.
A. Existing Attorney Speech Precedent Supports Strong Protection for
Attorney Advice
A re-examination of existing Supreme Court precedent on attorney
speech viewed through the lens of the attorney’s advice-giving role
between the interlocutors"). Another developed exploration of limitations on the tax advice
from attorneys is found in David Moldenhauer’s Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal
Ethics and First Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by
Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 843, 844 (2006) (examining "First Amendment limitations
on the regulation of professional speech in the context of . . . regulations which govern the
content and presentation of opinions and other written tax advice").
118. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Third) § 68 (2000).
119. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010).
120. See supra Part III.A–B (discussing recent cases involving attacks on restrictions on
attorney advice).
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provides strong support for First Amendment protection. Generally
speaking, in the situations where the Supreme Court has applied the First
Amendment to attorney regulation, strict scrutiny has not been the test
utilized. Three notable exceptions are NAACP v. Button,121 In re Primus,122
and Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.123 Though none of these cases
involved attorney advice overtly, all bear directly on how the Court should
apply the First Amendment to legislative restraints on attorney advice.
1. NAACP v. Button
NAACP v. Button is usually thought of as an association or solicitation
case, but the case also is about attorney advice.124 The Court ruled on only
one ground of many named by the NAACP in challenging the
Commonwealth of Virginia’s restrictions on law practice: "[T]he right of
the NAACP and its members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of
assisting persons who seek legal redress for infringements of their
constitutionally guaranteed and other rights."125 While framed in the
context of the First Amendment’s protections for association and petition of
the government, much of the Court’s opinion also implicitly rests upon the
free speech clause. The majority held that that the First Amendment
protects advice from NAACP attorneys to prospective litigants about
seeking legal assistance, notwithstanding Virginia’s power to regulate the
legal profession and improper solicitation of legal business.126

121. See NAACP v. Button, 377 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963) (holding that the legal aid
activities of the NAACP were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and thus
Virginia could not prohibit them).
122. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (holding that the state could not punish
solicitation of litigants by letter on behalf of a non-profit organization because the activity
was protected by the First Amendment).
123. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (holding that the
restriction prohibiting recipients of LSC funds from engaging in representation involving
effort to amend or otherwise challenge the validity of existing welfare laws was
unconstitutional).
124. See Button, 377 U.S. at 429 (addressing First Amendment protection of legal
solicitation meant to further political or social good).
125. Id. at 428.
126. See id. at 438 ("[O]nly a compelling state interest in regulation of a subject within
the State’s constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment
freedoms. . . . Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching
our most precious freedoms.").
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The dominant concern for the Court was the criminalization of an
attorney "who advises [a person] that his legal rights have been
infringed."127 The statutory restriction at issue risked "the gravest danger of
smothering all discussion looking to the eventual institution of litigation on
behalf of the rights of members of an unpopular minority."128 In making
this observation, it made "no difference" to the Court whether a lawyer
might actually be prosecuted under the statute: "It is enough that a vague
and broad statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular
causes."129
The Court also established that legal advice, itself, serves a political
function, for "[g]roups which find themselves unable to achieve their
objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts . . . . And under
the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole
practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of
grievances."130 Legal advice is a necessary component of litigation.
Finally, the Court dismissed the government’s interest in regulating
attorney misconduct through such a measure, observing that "a State may
not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore
constitutional rights."131
The Court extended the holding of Button to situations beyond the
civil rights context in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State
Bar.132 There, the Court declared that an injunction prohibiting the
Brotherhood from advising injured workers to obtain legal advice violated
the First Amendment.133 In United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 v.
Illinois State Bar Association,134 the Court again clarified that Button was
not meant to be limited solely to political litigation, and struck another
injunction brought by a state bar organization to prohibit a union from
hiring an attorney to advise members in processing workers’ compensation
127. Id. at 434.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 435.
130. Id. at 429–30 (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 439 (citations omitted).
132. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (holding that a
state cannot bar unions from referring injured employees to local attorneys).
133. See id. at 7 ("A State could not, by invoking the power to regulate the professional
conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of individuals and the public to be fairly
represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to effectuate a basic public interest.").
134. See United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217,
221–22 (1967) (holding that a state cannot bar unions from hiring attorneys "on a salary
basis to assist its members").

ATTORNEY ADVICE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

667

claims.135 The Court held "that the freedom of speech, assembly, and
petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives
petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its members
in the assertion of their legal rights."136 Several years later the Court
reaffirmed Button in United Transportation Union v. State Bar of
Michigan,137 observing that "meaningful access to the courts is a
fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment."138 Only
by protecting the free speech of attorneys to render advice is "meaningful
access" attained.139
Button and the union trilogy of cases have been read predominantly in
light of their guidance on solicitation of clients by lawyers and their
references to the right of association. Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith
extend this reading, observing that the cases "recognized the right of
individuals to be represented in lawsuits and to obtain meaningful access to
the courts."140 In particular, they explain, "the Supreme Court has held that
the underlying concern of Button and the union cases was that the aggrieved
receive information regarding their legal rights and the means of
effectuating them."141
Button also recognized the important First Amendment free speech
values inherent in attorney advice. This is evidenced in the opinion itself,
as highlighted above, and also in the way the Court applied Button in
subsequent opinions both in the union cases and in cases on attorney speech
from other contexts. While the First Amendment protection for attorney
135. See id. at 223 ("The litigation in question is, of course, not bound up with political
matters of acute social moment, as in Button, but the First Amendment does not protect
speech . . . only to the extent it can be characterized as political."). The Court goes on to
state:
Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded. The grievances for redress
of which the right of petition was insured, and with it the right of assembly, are
not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of free speech and a free
press are not confined to any field of human interest.
Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 221–22.
137. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585–86 (1971)
(holding that a state cannot restrict unions from assisting their members in obtaining legal
services).
138. Id. at 585.
139. See id. at 585–86 ("[Meaningful access] would be a hollow promise if courts could
deny associations of workers or others the means of enabling their members to meet the
costs of legal representation.").
140. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 13, at 348 (citations omitted).
141. Id. (citations omitted).
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advice was not directly at issue in these cases, like Button, they offer
compelling support.
2. In re Primus and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association
In re Primus142 and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association143 are also
typically categorized as solicitation cases, but the pair offers substantial
insight into the treatment of attorney advice. In Primus, the Court struck a
state disciplinary rule that infringed on an American Civil Liberties Union
lawyer’s First Amendment right to "advise[] a layperson of her legal rights
and disclose[] in a subsequent letter that free legal assistance is
available."144 The Court held that the state rule did not "withstand the
exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment
rights."145 The very same day, however, the Court upheld a ban on inperson solicitation of accident victims in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Association notwithstanding similar First Amendment concerns being
raised.146
Seeking to reconcile these decisions, the majority focused on the
unique concerns presented by in-person solicitation, i.e., where "the
overtures of an uninvited lawyer may distress the solicited individual
simply because of their obtrusiveness and the invasion of the individual’s
privacy."147 Yet the Primus majority glossed over the in-person contact that
occurred in that case, i.e., "[a]t the meeting, [the lawyer] advised those
present . . . who had been sterilized by Dr. Pierce, of their legal rights and
142. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (holding that the use of a state
disciplinary rule to bar the solicitation of a client by a political association attempting to
effectuate political change is an unconstitutional infringement of that organization’s First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
143. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978) (holding that states
"may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under
circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent").
144. Primus, 436 U.S. at 414.
145. Id. at 432 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1976)).
146. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–59 (explaining that in-person solicitation deserves a
lower "level of appropriate judicial scrutiny" than other forms of speech).
147. Id. at 465. Commentators also focus on the pecuniary interests in an effort to
reconcile these cases. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, From Buchanan to Button: Legal Ethics
and the NAACP (Part II), 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 281, 304–05 (2001) ("The Button
distinction between protected attorney conduct engaged in to further political interests
worthy of First Amendment protection and unprotected conduct of the same type engaged in
for pecuniary aims continues to drive the Supreme Court’s legal ethics jurisprudence.").
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suggested the possibility of a lawsuit."148 A close comparison of the cases’
factual details undermines the in-person solicitation rationale as the basis
for the disparate outcomes. Rather, it appears that the Court’s focus is less
about the physical proximity of solicitation by the lawyer and more about
the lawyer’s financial interest in the communication. The in-person
communication in Ohralik clearly involved a business transaction, and any
legal advice offered was only incidental to the goal of securing a new client
at best, if not mere bait to enable the transaction. The in-person
communication in Primus, by contrast, involved pure legal advice without
the attachment of the lawyer’s financial interest (though the dissent
suggested that the result turned more on a preference for "civil liberties
lawyers" over "ambulance chasers"149).
Another way to square the cases is to consider what they have to say
about attorney advice. On the one hand, the majority in Primus drew upon
the holding of Button to reach its result: "Whatever the precise limits of the
holding in Button, the Court at least found constitutionally protected the
activities of . . . lawyers in advising [about] constitutional rights . . . ."150
(And we know from the Court’s holding in United Mine Workers that this
extends to attorney advice beyond the enforcement of constitutional
rights.151) On the other hand, the focus in Ohralik was on the lawyer’s
financial interest in obtaining a new client, an activity that according to the
Court "has long been viewed as inconsistent with the profession’s ideal of
the attorney-client relationship and as posing a significant harm to the
prospective client."152
The Court viewed Ohralik’s speech as "a business transaction"
whereby the lawyer solicits remunerative employment, not the offering of
advice about potential legal rights,153 and rejected Ohralik’s contention that
his solicitation should be protected because he also provided "the solicited
individual with information about his or her legal rights and remedies."154
148. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 416 (1978).
149. Id. at 440 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 425 n.6 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
151. See supra notes 132–39 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s extension
of Button).
152. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978). A financial interest in
the delivery of legal services ought not, however, in and of itself render the speech
unprotected by the First Amendment. See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS:
SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY (2001).
153. See id. at 457 ("In-person solicitation by a lawyer of remunerative employment is a
business transaction . . . .").
154. Id. at 458.
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Notably, the disciplinary rule at issue in Ohralik did not prohibit a lawyer
from offering unsolicited legal advice; instead, it "merely prohibited him
from using the information as bait with which to obtain an agreement to
represent [clients] for a fee."155 Thus the divergent outcomes can be
reconciled by viewing Primus as a case about the free speech value of
rendering advice (warranting a high level of protection) and Ohralik as a
case about the free speech value of landing a new client (warranting lesser
protection in the Court’s view).156
3. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez
Like Button and Primus, Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez is not
commonly understood as an attorney advice case, but the holding goes to
the very heart of First Amendment protection for legal advice.157 Here, a 54 majority struck a federal restriction—in essence a ban on legal advice—
that prevented attorneys for the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) (a
congressionally created nonprofit organization providing legal assistance in
civil matters) from challenging the validity of a state or federal statute.158
155. Id.
156. One might question whether the Court’s view of Ohralik’s speech as a business
transaction justifies lesser free speech protection. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 152, at 232
("To restrict the expressive use of money, or the use of expression for the purpose of making
money, dramatically reduces the flow of information and opinion that forms the lifeblood of
democracy. Hence, such restriction contravenes core values served by the First Amendment’s
guarantee of free expression."). I offer this reading of Primus and Ohralik here to emphasize
the Court’s protection of advice in Primus even when it involves concerns that might be
associated with in-person solicitation. Elsewhere I argue, however, that the delivery of legal
services should not lose strong constitutional protection simply because the delivery is attached
to a financial transaction. See Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal
Services: On the First Amendment Rights of Corporations and Individuals (MSU Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 09-08), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1800258.
157. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (holding that the
federal government’s prohibition against challenging the validity of welfare laws, by attorneys
working for a congressionally-created legal aid organization, is an unconstitutional violation of
the First Amendment).
158. See id. at 536–37 ("[T]he restriction . . . prohibits legal representation funded by
recipients of LSC moneys if the representation involves an effort to amend or otherwise
challenge existing welfare law."). Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter
formed the majority. Id. at 536. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Thomas joined. Id. at 549. The particular
restriction under dispute "prevent[ed] an attorney from arguing to a court that a . . . state or
federal statute by its terms or in its application is violative of the United States Constitution."
Id. at 537. Other Legal Services Corporation restrictions on lobbying, class actions,
attorney’s fees, and solicitation have been upheld in the lower courts. Cf. Legal Aid Servs.
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Under the challenged restriction, the LSC attorneys were required to cease
representation immediately if a question about a statute’s validity arose,
whether "during initial attorney-client consultations or in the midst of
litigation proceedings."159
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion raised several concerns about this
predicament. First, he observed that the legislative restriction prevented
attorneys not only from advising clients, but also from advising the court
about "serious questions of statutory validity."160 Such an arrangement, he
wrote, "is inconsistent with the proposition that attorneys should present all
the reasonable and well-grounded arguments necessary for proper
resolution of the case."161 Second, a ban on "the analysis of certain legal
issues" in effect "prohibits speech and expression upon which courts must
depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power."162 Third, the
arrangement, he observed, "insulate[s] the Government’s laws from judicial
inquiry."163
Finally, Justice Kennedy expressed concern that, if the legislative
restriction was validated by the Court, "there would be lingering doubt
whether the truncated representation had resulted in . . . full advice to the
client."164 As a consequence both "[t]he courts and the public" would be
left "to question the adequacy and fairness of professional representations
when the attorney . . . avoided all reference to questions of [the banned
advice]."165 In recognizing the importance of "an informed, independent
bar,"166 he further noted that "[w]e must be vigilant when Congress imposes
rules and conditions which in effect insulate its own laws from legitimate
judicial challenge."167 Legislative restrictions on attorney advice risk doing
exactly that.168
of Or. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 608 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding "restrictions on
lobbying, soliciting clients, and participating in class actions").
159. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 546.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 545.
167. Id. at 548; see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 787 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("Laws punishing speech which protests the lawfulness or morality of the
government’s own policy are the essence of the tyrannical power the First Amendment
guards against.").
168. See supra Part III.A–B for a discussion of the Milavetz and HLP cases.
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Reading Button, Primus, and Velazquez together, some
commentators suggest that the Court robustly protected the speech at issue
in these cases because it was political in nature,169 others emphasize the
individual right to hear information.170 Yet each of these justifications has
counterpoints among the Court’s jurisprudence. For example, there are
cases involving attorney speech where the Court has denied strict
protection for what several members of the Court considered political
speech171 and elevated other interests over the individual’s right to hear.172
A unifying characteristic among these cases that has not been
explored in the literature, however, is the degree of advice-giving
involved. As this Article documents, when an attorney’s advice was at
risk of being silenced, the Court consistently chose an outcome to avoid
suppression of the advice. The foregoing discussion demonstrates how
past precedent offers ample support for strong First Amendment
protection of legal advice.
B. The Right to Petition and Other Constitutional Protections
While not a focus of this Article, it is important to note briefly that
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment is not the only source for
constitutional protection of legal advice. Indeed, in the earlier discussion
of Button and other cases we see how the right to assemble as well as due
process concerns conflate to support access to legal advice.173 Further, as
169. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 13, at 350 (suggesting that the Court
gives "the highest level of constitutional protection for advertisement or solicitation where
the lawyer is using litigation as a form of political expression").
170. See, e.g., Moldenhauer, supra note 117, at 894 (identifying a "hearer-centered"
approach to analyzing professional speech in First Amendment theory which seeks to ensure
the recipient "receives information that enhances his ability to make an informed and
autonomous choice").
171. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (holding that the First
Amendment rights of assistant district attorney discharged for circulation of questionnaire
regarding office conditions to co-workers were not violated); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (holding that First Amendment rights of district attorney retaliated
against for pointing out misrepresentations in a court affidavit were not violated).
172. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978) (upholding ban on
in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620
(1995) (holding that the Florida Bar’s thirty-day prohibition on direct mail solicitation by
lawyers of personal injury or wrongful death clients does not violate the First Amendment’s
protection of commercial speech).
173. I am grateful to Robert Gordon and Peter Margulies for their suggestions that I
consider the due process concerns when access is denied to legal advice, a topic beyond the
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noted at the outset of Part III, the First Amendment protects more than
speech; it protects "the right to petition Government for a redress of
grievances."174 This component of the First Amendment offers additional
authority for constitutional protection of legal advice. An attorney’s
advice and assistance in petitioning for a redress of grievances is
imperative, if not essential. As the Supreme Court held in Thomas v.
Collins,175 the "grievances for redress of which the right of petition was
insured . . . are not solely religious or political ones. And the right[] of
free speech . . . [is] not confined to any field of human interest."176 These
additional components of the First Amendment endorse a broad free
speech protection for legal advice.
Beyond the First Amendment, fundamental separation-of-powers
principles are threatened when the legislature prohibits a lawyer from
offering advice about a law that the legislature itself enacts.177 This is
particularly problematic where a minority is unable to obtain redress
through the ballot box (as in Button178), where a statutory challenge is a
necessary component of obtaining the client’s objectives (as in
Velazquez179), or in the context of resistance litigation,180 cause
scope of this Article but one deserving of attention that I intend to explore in future work.
For further discussion, see infra notes 184–85 and accompanying text (noting due process
concerns when legal advice is restricted).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
175. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) (holding that a Texas statute
violated the United Auto Workers Union president’s rights to free speech and free assembly
when it placed restrictions on his right to solicit membership).
176. Id. It is worth noting the importance of attorney advice in this case: "Upon
receiving [a restraining order], Thomas consulted his attorneys and determined to go ahead
with the meeting [in Texas] as planned. He did so because he regarded the law and the
citation as a restraint upon free speech . . . ." Id. at 522. Thomas was arrested for speaking
at the meeting, but ultimately vindicated before the Supreme Court. Id. at 523.
177. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001) (finding a statute
that would "insulate the Government’s laws from judicial inquiry" to be "inconsistent with
accepted separation-of-powers principles").
178. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 434 (1963) (finding that the statute at issue
risked committing "the gravest danger of smothering all discussion looking to the eventual
institution of litigation on behalf of the rights of members of an unpopular minority").
179. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546 (finding that prohibiting attorneys from
questioning the validity of a statute would lead to "lingering doubt whether the truncated
representation had resulted in complete analysis of the case, full advice to the client, and
proper presentation to the court").
180. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, Portraits of Resistance: Lawyer Responses to
Unjust Proceedings, 57 UCLA L. REV. 725 (2010) (addressing the lawyer’s role in a
manifestly unjust procedural regime).
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lawyering,181 and civil disobedience.182 Likewise, federalism issues are
raised when Congress regulates lawyer advice, an area traditionally left to
state court control.183 Due process concerns also are compromised:
More than 40 years ago the Court recognized a due process right to
retained counsel in civil proceedings . . . . It requires no expansion of
this well-established principle to hold that just as [the government] may
not arbitrarily prohibit retained counsel’s presence in a courtroom, so
too it may not arbitrarily prohibit or punish good-faith advice given by
retained counsel. The "right to be heard by counsel" is frustrated . . . by
preventing counsel . . . from giving good-faith professional advice to his
client.184

These constitutional grounds establish additional important sources of
protection for legal advice while simultaneously buttressing the free speech
interests in legal advice, as explored more fully below.185
C. The Free Speech Value of Advice
Sources of free speech value often are found in the autonomy of the
speaker or the marketplace of ideas.186 The value of attorney advice,
however, lies beyond the autonomy of the attorney and beyond the
marketplace of ideas (at least directly, since attorney advice is inherently
181. See generally John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges
of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
1927, 1931 (1999) (examining the nature of representing inner-city poor, or cause lawyering,
and arguing that "effective representation must collaborate with these clients not only to
represent them, but also to represent their place and communities").
182. See generally Judith A. McMorrow, Civil Disobedience and the Lawyer’s
Obligation to the Law, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 139, 139 (1991) ("Because the lawyer plays
a significant role in the shaping of the law and benefits materially from and has special
knowledge of the law, . . . the lawyer has special obligations both to uphold the law and to
strive to make the law just.").
183. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 7, at 569 ("Although the recent growth in federal
regulation reflects deep skepticism in some quarters about the efficacy of state regulation,
they are not readily ceding authority to Washington, either. [States] continue, often with
ABA support, to resist federal ‘intrusion.’" (citations omitted)).
184. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 471–72 (1975) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
185. These additional constitutional protections for legal advice deserve further
attention, and I hope to take up their bearing on the advice rendered by attorneys in a
subsequent article.
186. See, e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 973–74 (2007)
(discussing sources of First Amendment values).
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private in nature until it manifests in advocacy for the client or is made
public by the client, at which point the advice may very well impact the
marketplace of ideas or public deliberation187). Thus for similar reasons
that Robert Post cites to dismiss these sources in ascribing First
Amendment value to the speech of physicians, these justifications, alone,
seem inadequate to support special protection of attorney advice.188
Instead, the free speech value of legal advice can be located in at least three
distinct yet overlapping sources: (1) the inherently political function of
advice about the law; (2) the professional identity of an attorney and the
rights of a client; and (3) the unique relationship formed between an
attorney and her client. Each of these sources is taken up in turn below.
1. Political, Democratic, and Public Interests
One way to think about free speech protection for attorney advice is to
consider the political or democratic attributes. Interpreted broadly, advice
about the law is political speech because the law is necessarily the result of
a political process, whether legislative or at common law.189 To the extent
advice leads to adjudication, it is similarly valuable as political speech.190
This conception of political speech, of course, may be well beyond that
contemplated by philosopher Alexander Meikeljohn, credited with
establishing the modern understanding of First Amendment political
speech, even after he expanded his classification to include speech about

187. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, "Private" Speech and the "Private" Forum: Givhan
v. Western Line School District, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 238 (1979) [hereinafter Schauer,
"Private"] ("One of the values of freedom of speech is its function in helping to correct and
challenge accepted beliefs. This is a value that obtains under both the self-government and
market-place-of-ideas arguments." (citations omitted)).
188. Post, supra note 186, at 973–74.
189. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of
the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that the government may be
responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to . . . security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966) (noting that a
major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs).
190. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 116, at 712 (observing that "[a]djudication and politics
are alike in at least two obvious ways: both produce decisions that bind people, and both, at
least paradigmatically, are processes of government" and noting that "both adjudication and
political decisionmaking in our democracy rely on the same democratic value—
participation—to provide legitimacy").
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education, philosophy, social science, literature, and the arts.191 Under Cass
Sunstein’s approach, speech is to be treated as political "when it is both
intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some
issue."192 He acknowledges, however, that this definition "leaves many
questions unanswered."193
One of Professor Sunstein’s unanswered questions, it seems, is
whether attorney advice necessarily must be excluded from his political
speech theory simply because it does not immediately contribute to public
deliberation.194 Inevitably legal advice leads to matters of public interest,
whether in the form of something as limited as a negotiated contract
between private parties or as sweeping as a civil rights enforcement decree.
That it does not occur instantly ought not to devalue the ultimate political
contribution made by an attorney’s advice about the law. Indeed, Professor
Sunstein goes on to argue, in grounding his approach "for the Madisonian
conception of free speech," that "[g]overnment is rightly distrusted when it
is regulating speech that might harm its own interests."195 Legislative bans
on attorney advice about laws the government enacts warrant a similar kind
of distrust. Similarly, Vincent Blasi’s "checking value" offers another
rationale for protecting legal advice, at least to the extent such advice can
"serve in checking the abuse of power by public officials."196
Criticizing both Alexander Meiklejohn’s and Robert Post’s theories of
democratic free speech, Martin Redish and Abby Mollen propose that "a
valid democratic theory of the First Amendment must protect all speech
that allows individuals to discover their personal needs, interests and
goals—in government and society at large—and to advocate and vote
accordingly."197 While they do not focus specifically on the role of attorney
191. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (The Law Book Exch. 2004) (1948) (considering the freedom of speech
which is guaranteed by the Constitution).
192. Sunstein, supra note 168, at 130 (emphasis omitted).
193. Id. at 132.
194. See id. (noting that "political speech was thought to form the core of the free
speech principle" but that "[t]his does not mean that all other speech was entirely excluded;
but it does mean that the framers’ principal fear was government censorship of political
speech").
195. Id. at 132, 134.
196. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. 521, 527.
197. Martin H. Redish & Abby Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Merklejohn’s
Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 1303, 1307 (2009).
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advice within their theory, Redish and Mollen do contend that the First
Amendment must protect "all lawful advocacy."198 Yet, an attorney’s
advice surely is the very kind of speech they contemplate that "allows
individuals to discover their personal needs, interests and goals."199
In addition to finding sources of political value in attorney advice from
First Amendment doctrine, the political and democratic value of attorney
advice also is a recurrent theme found in the Supreme Court’s attorney
speech precedent. For example, as mentioned in the earlier discussion of
Button and its progeny, the Court has long recognized the political function
of attorney advice where "[g]roups which find themselves unable to achieve
their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts."200
The Preamble to the Model Rules further elucidates the political
attributes of attorney advice. For example, the Preamble explains that
"[t]he legal profession is largely self-governing . . . [and] is unique in this
respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the
processes of government and law enforcement."201 As such, "selfregulation also helps maintain the legal profession’s independence from
government domination."202 This is critical because "[a]n independent legal
profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for
abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose
members are not dependent on government for the right to practice."203
The political or democratic value of advice rendered by attorneys is
reflected in First Amendment theory,204 Supreme Court precedent,205 and
professional conduct rules.206 Another important source of free speech

198.
199.
200.

Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1307.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (citations omitted); see also DANIEL
MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE
171–211 (2008) (discussing lawyerly fidelity and political legitimacy). Markovits remarks:
"One might say, then, that what democracy is to political legitimacy at wholesale,
adjudication is to political legitimacy at retail." Id. at 185.
201. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl. 10 (2010).
202. Id. at pmbl. 11.
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 189–96 and accompanying text (discussing Alexander
Mieklejohn’s, Cass Sunstein’s, and Vincent Blasi’s theories of political speech).
205. See supra Part IV.A (discussing three Supreme Court cases: NAACP v. Button, In
re Primus, and Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez).
206. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing the Preamble to the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
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value for legal advice is located in the professional identity of the attorney
and the rights of the client.
2. Professional Identity of the Attorney and Rights of the Client
The First Amendment value in an attorney’s professional identity is
more than just the individual autonomy of the attorney as a speaker or
public citizen, though these values must be acknowledged. An attorney’s
identity as a member of the legal profession also holds First Amendment
significance.207 The rights of clients must be taken into account as well,
under what some commentators label the "hearer-centered" theory.208 The
Court has observed that under the First Amendment, "the protection
afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both."209
This includes a constitutional "right to receive information and ideas."210 In
other words, "[t]he First Amendment injury to a lawyer that stems from [an
advice ban] directly translates into a First Amendment injury to her
client."211 For example, in the attorney advertising line of cases, the Court
repeatedly recognized the legal rights of the targeted recipients of the

207. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the
Regulation of Lawyers and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1, 67 (2008)
[hereinafter Margulies, True Believers] (acknowledging "the lawyer’s freedom under the
First Amendment to forge a professional identity").
208. See Moldenhauer, supra note 117, at 843 & n.2 (noting that there is no consensus
among academics on the proper approach to regulating professional speech and citing
several advocates of a "hearer-centered" First Amendment theory).
209. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
756 (1976) (holding that statutory ban on advertising drug prices for prescription drugs
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
210. Id. at 757 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 967
(Okla. 1988) ("The right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences is crucial, for it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail.").
211. Tusk, supra note 116, at 1229. Tusk further remarks:
An attorney speaks at trial or oral argument only for the client . . . . When the
lawyer speaks in this setting, it is as if the client has spoken the words
herself. . . . [Thus,] the First Amendment harm is suffered not only by the
individual who would have spoken the words, but by the individual for whose
benefit the words would have been spoken.
Id. at 1229–30.
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speech, the potential clients.212 This is true, said the Court, even if the
recipient’s choice ultimately is undesirable:
To be sure, some citizens, accurately informed of their legal rights, may
file lawsuits that ultimately turn out not to be meritorious. But the State
is not entitled to prejudge the merits of its citizens’ claims by choking
off access to information that may be useful to its citizens in deciding
whether to press those claims in court.213

Such protection is all the more important when "the regulation would
directly inhibit the public’s right to receive this information from those who
under ordinary circumstances are most calculated to be intimately familiar
with this aspect of the government process."214 Indeed, attorneys are "most
calculated to be intimately familiar" with advice about the law and how it is
to be applied to their clients’ circumstances.215
To consider the value of advice from another angle, as Professor
Pepper explains, "law is a public good that is intended to be available for
individuals to use in leading their lives . . . . This means that a client has a
clear interest in, and perhaps even an entitlement to, knowledge of the law
that governs her."216 He goes so far as to connect the client’s interest in
legal advice directly with the political and democratic values articulated
above:
212. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (holding unconstitutional a
state statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices, thus opening
the door to First Amendment protection for professional commercial speech). To justify
establishing this new protected category, the Court explained: "As to the particular
consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen,
if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate." Id. at 763.
Following this case, the Court took up a number of cases extending protection to the
commercial speech of attorneys. See supra note 104 (listing cases).
213. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 645 n.12 (1985); see also Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 209 (1972) (advancing an approach that would protect the listener—
in this case the client—by prohibiting government from banning speech—in this case an
attorney’s advice—because it might influence the listener). But see Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 334 (1985) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to a
cap on attorneys’ fees in veterans’ benefit cases). In Walters, the Court held that a federal
law limiting attorneys’ fees in veterans’ benefit cases to a maximum of ten dollars did not
violate the First Amendment because other alternatives were available for "a claimant to
make a meaningful presentation" in the claims process. Id. at 335. Justice Stevens,
dissenting, disagreed noting that in prior cases the Court "necessarily assumed that the
individual’s right to ask for, and to receive, legal advice from the lawyer of his choice was
fully protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 368 n.16.
214. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 766 P.2d at 967.
215. Id.
216. Pepper, supra note 6, at 1598–99.
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[O]ur democratic constitutional order presumes that persons do have
something approaching a "right" to know "the law" that purports to
govern them. (The notion of keeping the knowledge from them implies,
disturbingly, someone or some institution on high deciding who is to
know what about the law.)217

The First Amendment value in an attorney’s professional identity and the
client’s right to information about the law is compounded further when one
is considering the professional bond formed through the attorney-client
relationship.
3. The Unique Relationship Between the Attorney and the Client
Another source of free speech value is found in the relationship
between the attorney and the client. In noting that the "definition of
professional speech is undoubtedly incomplete," Robert Post observes that,
in the case of medical professionals, the "First Amendment may apply
differently to state regulation of professional speech compared with state
regulation of physicians’ speech that does not form part of the practice of
medicine."218 This observation certainly is true for the legal profession as
well. Daniel Halberstam defines professional advice as "advice that is
sought by a client pertain[ing] to a predefined understanding between the
interlocutors about the nature of the ensuing communicative interaction."219
He asserts that "[t]he professional is understood to be acting under a
commitment to the ethical and intellectual principles governing the
profession . . . ."220
For the attorney, these principles are embodied in the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in some form by every state except
California, which follows its own similar set of professional guides.221
Accordingly, says Halberstam, the professional "is not thought of as free to
challenge the mode of discourse or the norms of the profession while

217. Id. at 1599.
218. Post, supra note 186, at 952.
219. Halbertstam, supra note 16, at 834.
220. Id.
221. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Dates of Adoption,
www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Mar. 27,
2011) (listing the states that have adopted the ABA Model Rules) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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remaining within the parameters of the professional discussion."222 He
maintains:
[W]hether the relationships are ones of trust, such as those between
lawyer and client or doctor and patient, or are merely common material
enterprises, such as those between buyers and sellers, their presence
triggers a contextual First Amendment review that is specifically
centered around the social relation, as opposed to an abstract review
such as that traditionally applied to the street-corner speaker.223

So it is in more than the attorney’s professional identity or the client’s free
speech rights, alone, where protection for legal advice can be found.
Important First Amendment rights are triggered by the attorney-client
relationship itself.
A component of this relationship value is revealed in the line of
Supreme Court cases on professional speech. The few cases where the
Court has considered restrictions on professional speech signal the First
Amendment value in the attorney-client relationship, but also reveal
important distinctions between the advice of attorneys and the advice of
other professionals like pharmacists, financial advisors, and physicians. For
example, in Rust v. Sullivan,224 the Court suggested that "traditional
relationships such as that between doctor and patient should enjoy
protection under the First Amendment from Government regulation" but
declined to resolve the issue. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,225 however, the Court upheld a state statute
requiring that doctors provide certain state-mandated information to
patients seeking an abortion prior to obtaining their consent.226 While the
Court acknowledged that a physician holds "First Amendment rights not to
speak," those rights exist "only as part of the practice of medicine, subject
to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State."227

222. Halbertstam, supra note 14, at 834.
223. Id.
224. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (ruling that a regulation limiting
the application of Title X funds to abortion services did not violate the First or Fifth
Amendment).
225. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)
(ruling that a state may regulate abortion so long as the regulations do not place an undue
burden on the woman’s decision).
226. See id. at 881–83 (validating that a state requirement of informed consent for an
abortion is not an undue burden and falls within a state’s health and welfare powers).
227. Id. at 884.
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Rust and Casey have since been read by at least one commentator to
support the protection of free speech value in physician advice.228 Thus in
Conant v. Walters,229 the Ninth Circuit upheld a physician’s right under the
First Amendment to advise seriously ill patients about the use of medical
marijuana.230 To reach this result, the court cited both Casey and Rust for
the principle that "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that physician
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection because of the
significance of the doctor-patient relationship."231 The Court also noted that
"[a]ttorneys have rights to speak freely subject only to the government
regulating with ‘narrow specificity.’"232
Yet, the unique attributes of the attorney-client relationship demand
even stronger protection than for other professionals. As the Supreme
Court has acknowledged, "[u]nlike a lawyer, [a physician] owes no duty of
‘undivided loyalty’ to his patients."233 The special duties compelled by the
attorney-client relationship impart considerable justifications for First
Amendment protection. While professional conduct standards do not
establish the contours of the First Amendment or, on their own, create a
constitutional entitlement, the Supreme Court has looked to rules and
guidelines promulgated by the ABA and similar professional organizations
when assessing the scope of constitutional rights in other contexts.234 For
228. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 16, at 775 (discussing Rust and Casey).
Halberstam notes that:
The Rust majority’s recognition, at least in principle, of the protected status of
physician-patient communications, comports with the Court’s judgment
elsewhere in the legal and medical contexts that professionals play a special role
in assisting individuals in the exercise of personal autonomy and the vindication
of basic rights. This conclusion, however, counsels against the simple deduction
from the lead opinion in Casey that professional speech is generally entitled to
only "minimal" or "reduced" protection under the First Amendment. Reading
Rust and Casey together, then, suggests that professional speech is subject to a
more complicated balance of First Amendment protection.
Id.
229. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (2002) (ruling that a federal policy
prohibiting a physician from discussing marijuana as a treatment was not sufficiently narrow
to survive First Amendment scrutiny), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 946 (2003).
230. Id. at 632 (affirming the lower court’s injunction against enforcing the federal
policy because it was a violation of the First Amendment).
231. Id. at 636 (citations omitted).
232. Id. at 637 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 438–39 (1963)).
233. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320 (1981).
234. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (referencing the ABA
standards as a guide to what is reasonable representation in the context of a challenge to
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment); cf. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.
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example, recently in Padilla v. Kentucky,235 the Supreme Court relied upon
guidelines from the ABA and others to rule in a 7-2 decision that a criminal
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to be advised by her attorney about
the deportation consequences of a guilty plea.236 Applying the first prong
of Strickland v. Washington’s237 test for ineffective assistance of counsel—
"whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness"238—Justice Stevens explained that this inquiry "is
necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal community"
or "prevailing professional norms."239
To determine the norms entitled to constitutional protection, the
Padilla Court relied upon ABA standards.240 Likewise, in the Milavetz
opinion, the Court found that the bankruptcy advice ban’s validity hinged
upon interpreting it narrowly in conformance with Model Rule 1.2(d).241
Thus, an appreciation of the ABA standards is important not only because
157, 165 (1986) (looking to the Model Rules for guidance but cautioning that "[w]hen
examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct
acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to consitutionalize particular
standards of professional conduct . . ."); see also Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal
Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910–1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 146 (2002) (explaining
how Button extended First Amendment protection to "test case litigation strategies that the
NAACP’s first national legal committee had handled half a century before as a matter of an
implicitly shared, scarcely articulated, informal professional norm").
235. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (concluding that "constitutionally competent
counsel would have advised [Padilla] that his conviction for drug distribution made him
subject to automatic deportation").
236. Id. at 1482. Commentators have called this decision "an extraordinary expansion
of the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants." Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Colgate
Love, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right to Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of
Conviction 1 (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 10-16, 2010), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1591264.
237. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984) (ruling that a defendant
who has not proven either the "prejudice or performance components of an ineffectiveness
inquiry" will fail to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
238. Id. at 688.
239. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (citations omitted).
240. As Justice Stevens explained: "We long have recognized that prevailing norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to
determining what is reasonable . . . . Although they are only guides, and not inexorable
commands, these standards may be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms
of effective representation." Id. at 1482 (citations omitted).
241. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1337–38
(2010) (finding that the ban on attorney advice in the BAPCPA was in line with the
requirements of Model Rule 1.2(d)). See supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text
(explaining the ban and the Court’s view that a narrow interpretation was essential to
upholding it).
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they reveal how legislative advice bans compromise the duties and
obligations demanded by the attorney-client relationship, but because those
standards can offer a meaningful measure of constitutional rights.
Several of the ABA Model Rules bear on the lawyer’s obligations
when rendering advice to the client. For example, the Model Rules require
that an attorney "provide competent representation,"242 "exercise
independent professional judgment,"243 "explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation,"244 and "render candid advice."245 The Model
Rules also permit a lawyer to "discuss the legal consequences of any
proposed course of conduct" and to "counsel or assist a client to make a
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of
the law."246 To fulfill these responsibilities an attorney must explain to a
client all potential alternatives and consequences associated with a
particular situation. This may demand, in some cases, advice about a
course of action designed to challenge the law or government action.247
Finally, the notion that an attorney’s advice can be constitutionally
criminalized or otherwise banned raises serious concerns within the
relationship beyond duties derived from the Model Rules—enforcement
would necessitate a breach of attorney-client privilege protections.248
The attorney-client relationship also manifests in a greater social good,
in that the private advice ultimately leads to some sort of public action.249
242. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010).
243. Id. R. 2.1.
244. Id. R. 1.4(b).
245. Id. R. 2.1; see also Deborah Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317,
1319 (2006) (stating that "lawyers, as fiduciaries for clients, have a moral obligation to
provide informed, independent, and disinterested legal advice" and "as officers of the court
and fiduciaries for the legal system, [l]awyers should counsel clients to comply with the
purposes and letter of the law").
246. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2.
247. See, e.g., id. pmbl. 5 ("While it is a lawyer’s duty, when necessary, to challenge the
rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.").
248. See, e.g., Margulies, True Believers, supra note 207, at 54 (suggesting that "[t]he
threat of criminal prosecution may erect a barrier between lawyer and client, making
communication more difficult"). It should also be recognized, however, that if an attorney’s
advice is in furtherance of an illegal activity, the evidentiary crime-fraud exception may
remove the protection for those communications. See Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal
Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 673 (2005) ("[T]he government cannot compel disclosure of
privileged communications absent proof that they were made to further a crime or fraud.").
249. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (describing the function and effect
of attorney advice within larger society).
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This is yet another source of free speech value, for "the First Amendment
frequently and properly provide[s] protection to other-regarding . . . acts," a
quality that Frederick Schauer calls "a surprising feature for a truly
individual right," but notes that "a large number of the widely accepted
justifications for freedom of speech are about the social and not individual
value of granting to individuals an instrumental right to freedom of
speech."250 There is free speech value in the professional interaction
inherent in the attorney-client relationship. In some ways the political or
democratic value of attorney advice is bound up with the individual rights
of the attorney and client as well as the value found in the attorney-client
relationship itself, but as this discussion has shown, it is important to
consider each of these components individually in order to fully appreciate
the reasons why the First Amendment should be applied to protect legal
advice.
D. Arguments Against Protection Do Not Hold Up
Some may question First Amendment protection for attorney advice
even in the face of (and perhaps because of) the arguments advanced thus
far in this Article, but on close examination the arguments against
protection simply do not hold up. This section addresses the strongest
arguments against protection for legal advice and shows how these
contentions actually endorse protection rather than undermine it. The
arguments include treatment of advice as mere communication incidental to
the conduct of practicing law, the private nature of advice, the financial
compensation of attorneys for rendering advice, and the notion that law
practice is a privilege with special obligations for lawyers as officers of the
court.
1. Advice as Communication Incidental to the Practice of Law
A more conservative approach would not extend First Amendment
protection to attorney advice, viewing it as communication incidental to the
conduct of practicing law. The fact that advice involves speaking, so the
argument goes, does not automatically make it protected speech under the
First Amendment.
This concept of differentiating between speech as
250. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1256, 1268 (2005).
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speech versus speech as conduct was articulated by the Court in Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co.251 There the Court observed that "it has never
been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course
of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or
printed."252
Justice White’s concurrence in Lowe v. SEC253 is often used to support
this point related to the legal profession:
These ideas help to locate the point where regulation of a profession
leaves off and prohibitions on speech begin. One who takes the affairs
of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on
behalf of the client in the light of the client’s individual needs and
circumstances is properly viewed as engaging in the practice of a
profession. Just as offer and acceptance are communications incidental
to the regulable transaction called a contract, the professional’s speech is
incidental to the conduct of the profession.254

Marginalizing legal advice in this way, however, ignores the attorney-client
relationship’s unique obligations both to the individual participants but also
to the public as a whole when advice manifests into transactions, advocacy,
and the like. To use the words of Chief Justice Roberts in writing for the
HLP majority, categorizing attorney advice as conduct is an "extreme
position" that fails to account for the complexities of the situation.255 To
251. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 (1949) (holding that
a state is not compelled to apply or not apply anti-trade restraint laws to specific groups by
the First Amendment).
252. Id. at 502.
253. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (concluding that the publishers of an
investment newsletter fit a statutory exception for "bona fide" publications and thus the
publishers did not need to be registered "investment advisors").
254. Id. at 232 (White, J., concurring); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 455
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("But litigation, whether or not associated with the attempt to
vindicate constitutional rights, is conduct; it is speech plus."); Robert Post, The
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9 (2000) ("[S]ocial life is
full of communicative processes that are routinely regulated without the benefit of First
Amendment analysis. . . . [First Amendment] scrutiny is brought to bear only when the
regulation of communication affects a constitutional value specifically protected by the First
Amendment." (citation omitted)). But cf. Post, supra note 19, at 40–79 (identifying the
constitutional value of democratic competence as trigger for First Amendment scrutiny of
regulations on professional expertise or discipline).
255. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010)
(specifying that the Government went too far in arguing that advice given to terrorist
organizations was "conduct" and thus should not fall under free speech protections). One
might also contend that if "political speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply
because its source is a corporation," it follows that political speech does not lose First
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the extent an attorney’s advice is conduct, it also "consists of
communicating a message"256 that warrants some level of First Amendment
protection, a point on which it seems the entire Roberts Court may very
well agree.
As Eugene Volokh writes, "[m]any professional-client relationships—
lawyer-client, psychotherapist-patient, accountant-client, even often doctorpatient—mostly consist of speech . . . one asking questions and the other
giving advice."257 Yet these relationships are governed by "speech
restrictions and speech compulsions that would generally be forbidden in
other contexts."258 Professor Volokh contends that "[s]uch restrictions and
compulsions may in fact be properly upheld[, as t]here may be something in
a professional-client relationship that would justify such extra
regulation."259 The question remains, of course, about the level of
protection to be applied, a point taken up in Part IV.260 But first a few
additional arguments against protection for attorney advice must be
resolved.
2. The Private Nature of Advice
Another argument against finding free speech value in attorney advice
might be based in the inherently private nature of advice. For example,
Justice White also observed in Lowe that a restriction on advice to the
general public might not survive First Amendment scrutiny, but private
advice may be regulated.261 There are different layers to the public-private
divide, including the physical space or location where the speech occurs
Amendment protection simply because it is advice from an attorney. See Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (noting that "[t]he identity of the speaker
is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected" and that "corporations . . . should
[not] be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are
not natural persons" (citations omitted)).
256. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
257. Eugene Volokh, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS,
CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 306 (3d ed. 2008).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 307. Volokh also notes: "[T]he Court has never explained (1) exactly what
speech restrictions and speech compulsions would be allowed in such a situation, or (2)
exactly when this reduced protection would be triggered." Id.
260. See infra Part IV (arguing that strict scrutiny or a similar test is necessary).
261. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228–30 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (noting
that regulation of speech is often permissible even if a complete restriction of speech would
violate the First Amendment).
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(e.g. behind a closed officer door versus on a street corner soapbox), the
interests involved (e.g. personal interests of the speaker/listener versus
public interests), and the audience proximity (e.g. face-to-face between two
individuals versus a crowd of people).262 Legal advice, especially if
covered by attorney-client privilege, is by definition private on all three
fronts—location, interests, and proximity. Attorneys give advice face-toface, behind a closed office door (figuratively and literally), related to the
client’s immediate interest.
To dismiss attorney advice from protection because it is private in
these ways, however, neglects to account for the ways that private advice
ultimately may manifest in the enforcement of rights or interests for the
public good (or at least produce valuable public information). This is seen
in the earlier discussion about how advice contributes to political life.263
Moreover, such a position neglects to account for the very text of the First
Amendment. On this point the writing of Frederick Schauer is instructive.264
Examining the case Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
District,265 he observed that "the distinction between public speech and
private speech is indeed not suggested by the words ‘freedom of
speech.’"266 As the Givhan Court explained:
The First Amendment forbids abridgment of the freedom of speech.
Neither the Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this
freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate

262. Frederick Schauer discusses the "several senses of the public-private distinction"
and includes a fourth consideration, the citizen versus the public employee. Schauer,
"Private," supra note 187, at 242.
263. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the political, democratic, and public interests
served by advice).
264. I am grateful to Geof Stone for his suggestion to consider Frederick Schauer’s
analysis of Givhan v. Western Line School District in developing this argument.
265. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) (holding that
First Amendment "freedom is [not] lost to the public employee who arranges to
communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public").
266. Schauer, "Private," supra note 187, at 226. Schauer explains:
What the Court did hold in Givhan is that private speech is not for that reason
alone excluded from either the coverage or the protection of the First
Amendment. . . . This implies that the distinction between public speech and
private speech is never relevant in First Amendment adjudication, an implication
that derives much support from the unqualified nature of the Court’s opinion as
well as from the Court’s statement that the lack of such a distinction is derived
directly from the text of the First Amendment.
Id. at 230.
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privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the
public. We decline to adopt such a view of the First Amendment.267

Building on the Givhan opinion, Professor Schauer maintains that "[t]he
public forum is indeed the catalyst for much discussion of public matters.
But the public forum is not the end of the process. The culmination of the
process is to be found in the discussion among people in much more
cloistered settings."268 Applying his argument in this context, one might
say that attorney advice is the catalyst for the result that culminates in the
public forum, whether in the formation of a contract or the delivery of a
court opinion.
Professor Schauer further argues that "[i]t may be one sign of a
totalitarian society that people are imprisoned for what they say in
public . . . . But the ultimate affront to the notion of a free society occurs
when people are imprisoned for what they say in their living rooms."269 His
point is all the more compelling where attorneys are criminalized or
otherwise penalized for their advice: "We are in danger when the informer
is one member of a large audience, but we are in greater danger when the
informer is our next-door neighbor."270 Perhaps the gravest danger is when
the informer is an attorney, the only one who fully understands the legal
process.
Justice O’Connor expressed a related but different concern associated
with the private-public distinction when evaluating attorney-advertising
restrictions, focusing instead on the vulnerabilities of a potential client
"when an attorney offers unsolicited advice . . . in a personal encounter."271
In her concurrence in Zauderer, she writes: "[T]he legal advice
accompanying an attorney’s pitch for business is not merely apt to be
complex and colored by the attorney’s personal interest. The advice is also
offered outside of public view, and in a setting in which the prospective
client’s judgment may be more easily intimidated or overpowered."272 It
may be that Justice O’Connor is correct about the vulnerable nature of
potential clients, at least in some instances, but once the attorney-client
relationship is established these concerns presumably are addressed by the
267. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415–16.
268. Schauer, "Private," supra note 187, at 236.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 674 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part dissenting in part).
272. Id.
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attorney’s professional obligations and duties to her client.273
O’Connor’s concerns stem from what she calls "the exigencies of the
marketplace" and her fear that "a rule permitting the use of legal advice
in advertisements will encourage lawyers to present that advice most
likely to bring potential clients into the office, rather than that advice
which it is most in the interest of potential clients to hear."274 Perhaps
this concern remains even after the attorney-client relationship is
formed, especially to the extent a client’s work comprises a large
component of the attorney’s practice. But professional discipline rules
and ethical obligations, rather than a ban on advice, are the most
appropriate vehicle for addressing these potential conflicts.275
3. Financial Compensation
Some might dismiss the free speech value of attorney advice
because it is a service given to the client in exchange for compensation.
But the Court has made "clear . . . that speech does not lose its First
Amendment protection because money is spent to project it."276 It is
well established that the safeguards for free speech may be applied to
"business or economic activity."277 As the Court has explained, "it does
not resolve where the line shall be drawn in a particular case merely to
urge . . . that an organization for which the rights of free speech and free
assembly are claimed is one engaged in business activities or that the
individual who leads it in exercising these rights receives compensation
for doing so."278 Thus the lawyer’s advice, "even though it is . . . sold
for profit," remains subject to free speech protection.279

273. See infra Part IV.C and accompanying text (discussing solutions other than bans
on attorney advice and noting the protection offered by the professional duties required of
attorneys).
274. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 678.
275. See infra Part IV (discussing the circumstances in which an attorney’s advice may
be constitutionally constrained and suggesting mechanisms preferable to advice bans for
addressing concerns about problematic legal advice).
276. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761 (1976) (citations omitted).
277. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
278. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
279. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
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4. The Privilege of the Practice and Officers of the Court
A final argument challenging the free speech value inherent in
attorney advice might rest on the notion that attorneys give up certain
speech rights in exchange for the privilege of practice, or because of
their duties to the court and the public. For example, the Supreme Court
has long recognized that "[a] state can require high standards of
qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law,
before it admits an applicant to the bar [so long as] any qualification
[has] a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to
practice law."280 Lawyers are also "called officers of the court . . . and
swear allegiance to support and defend the Constitution of the United
States."281 Consequently, some commentators suggest that in exchange
for the privilege of law practice or due to the obligations as an officer of
the court, attorneys surrender certain free speech rights. There are
aspects of legal practice where this surrender makes sense and fulfills
important duties of the lawyer to her client and to the legal system. For
example, professional conduct rules subject attorneys to discipline for
revealing client confidences282 or for making prejudicial statements to
the press during a judicial proceeding,283 whereas an ordinary citizen’s
speech in these circumstances could not be similarly constitutionally
constrained.
The privilege of practice or officer of the court
justifications do not apply in the same fashion, however, when an
attorney renders advice. When an attorney offers her client advice,
professional independence from the state demands speech autonomy for
the attorney in ways that do not apply in the context of licensing,
confidentiality, or statements to the press.284
280. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
281. McMorrow, supra note 182, at 139 (citations omitted).
282. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010) (detailing the lawyer’s duty
of confidentiality and noting the narrow, specific exceptions to confidentiality). For a
discussion of confidentiality and free speech concerns, see Zacharias, Rethinking, supra note
116.
283. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 ("A lawyer who is participating or
has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial
statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means
of public communication . . . ."). For a discussion of statements to the press and free speech
concerns, see Chermerinsky, supra note 109.
284. See, e.g., Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1981) ("[I]t is the
constitutional obligation of the State to respect the professional independence of the public
defenders whom it engages. . . . Implicit in the concept of a guiding hand is the assumption
that counsel will be free of state control." (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345
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In the end, the arguments against protection for legal advice
because it is conduct, private, and compensated, or because an attorney
surrenders certain speech rights as a condition of practice or officer of
the court, fail to deliver a meaningful rationale for denying First
Amendment protection to legal advice rendered by attorneys.
Part III answers the first question posed at the outset of this article
in the affirmative. The advice from an attorney to her client deserves
First Amendment protection, a conclusion supported by Supreme Court
precedent on attorney speech and by free speech values found in
attorney advice. Part IV turns to the second question, reflecting on
when the government may constitutionally limit an attorney’s advice to
her client. This discussion necessarily demands an inquiry into the
content of the advice, especially when legal advice leads to illegal
activity.
IV. (Un)Constitutional Restrictions on Attorney Advice
To be sure, the role of attorney advice in questionable or outright
illegal client behavior is well-documented and, in fact, is the subject of
an entire "subgenre of legal ethics scholarship."285 There is no
dispute that sometimes lawyers deliver mistaken,286 immoral,287 or
(1963))).
285. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 1167, 1172 (2005) [hereinafter Wendel, Professionalism] (noting the "subgenre of
legal ethics scholarship that examines the lawyer’s responsibilities as a law-interpreter and
private law-giver"). See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in
Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669 (1981); Sanford
Levison, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 353 (1986). See also articles cited supra notes 6, 8, 14, and infra notes 287, 288, 324,
326, 339.
286. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (holding that lawyer’s
misadvice about deportation consequences of guilty plea may be a constitutional violation).
287. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Is Law (Still) an Honorable Profession?, 19 No. 2 PROF.
LAW. 23, 24 (2009) [hereinafter Gillers, Honorable Profession] (observing that "Big
Tobacco’s success in hiding the science that showed that tobacco kills was accomplished
with the highly creative help of clever lawyers who managed to bury the information by
concocting a theory that the laboratory results were protected by the attorney-client
privilege" (citation omitted)); Stephen Gillers, More About Us: Another Take on the Abusive
Use of Legal Ethics Rules, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 843, 847 (1998) ("Making a farfetched,
and I believe legally incorrect, but nonfrivolous claim of attorney-client privilege is not an
offense under professional conduct norms. . . . A broader question is whether the tobacco
lawyers act unacceptably as human beings . . . ."); see also Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice
as Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225, 249 (2006) (discussing the advice of
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illegal288 advice. Deborah Rhode and others note that "[l]awyers have
been implicated in almost all of the major health, safety, and financial
scandals of recent decades."289 Yet a glaring omission exists within the
legal advice literature—the question of free speech protection for that
advice.
This Article represents one modest endeavor to fill the breach. In
light of the values established in Part III and the relevant Supreme Court
precedent identified in support of those values, it seems reasonable that
restraints on advice should be reviewed under strict scrutiny or a similarly
protective test.290 In other words, any constraint must be necessary to
further a compelling government interest and narrowly tailored to do so
attorneys in the Catholic Church abuse scandal). Vischer quotes one bishop as observing:
"We made terrible mistakes. Because the attorneys said over and over ‘Don’t talk to the
victims, don’t go near them,’ and here they were victims. I heard victims say ‘We would not
have taken it to plaintiffs’ attorneys had someone just come to us and said ‘I’m sorry.’" Id.
288. See, e.g., William Simon, The Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic
Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1555, 1556 (2008)
(describing the bad and sometimes illegal advice given to clients by attorneys in recent
years). Simon notes:
On several notorious occasions in recent years, lawyers gave clients bad legal
advice because the clients wanted it. Lawyers . . . gave opinions to Enron
that . . . were either plainly wrong or plainly irrelevant to the circumstances they
addressed. Lawyers . . . gave hundreds of opinions to taxpayers . . . [that] were
virtually copies of transactions that the IRS had specifically condemned. John
Yoo, Jay Bybee, and other lawyers at the Department of Justice gave opinions to
federal officials . . . [that] exaggerated the authority for the conclusions and
omitted inconsistent arguments and precedent.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Peter Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence and Collective
Illegality in Government and Corporate Misconduct, Terrorism, and Organized Crime, 58
RUTGERS L. REV. 939, 952–53 (2006) [hereinafter Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence]
(observing that "[l]awyers who knowingly give advice that facilitates client wrongdoing
violate a basic rule of legal ethics" and referencing examples of Lynne Stewart’s "conviction
on charges for lending material support to terrorist activity" and the collusion of tobacco
industry lawyers with cigarette manufacturers to conceal adverse health studies).
289. Rhode, supra note 245, at 1320. To be clear, this Article’s support for strong First
Amendment protection of attorney advice is not meant to suggest that lawyers do not have
an obligation to follow the law. For a compelling exchange on the lawyer’s duty to obey the
law, see generally William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 217 (1996); David Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A Comment on Simon,
38 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 255 (1996); David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality:
Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
269 (1996). The role of lawyers in client wrongdoing is well-documented by other scholars
and thus not a primary focus here.
290. See supra notes 75, 126 and accompanying text (noting the test articulated in
Button, "compelling state interest," as compared to the "more demanding review" required in
HLP).
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using the least restrictive means possible.291 The question that follows, of
course, is when, if ever, may the government constitutionally restrain legal
advice? The remainder of this Article offers a response. To do so,
identified below are some of the easier cases and some of the more difficult
cases followed by a list of alternatives to advice bans that accomplish a
ban’s goals without compromising the free speech interests identified in
Part III.292
A. The Easier Cases
Having established the political and other free speech values of legal
advice in Supreme Court precedent and First Amendment doctrine, this
Article assumes that a strict-scrutiny type of review must be applied to any
government constraint on legal advice.293 Under this assumption, there are
at least two restrictions that seem to be clearly constitutional (though debate
might exist as to the practical merits of such restrictions, a topic not
addressed here294). It should be relatively uncontroversial that the
government may enact a ban on attorney advice if it satisfies the standards
articulated by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, and that the
government may enact a ban on attorney advice directing a client to engage
in criminal or fraudulent activity (but not advice about criminal or
fraudulent activity, an important distinction), provided the ban contains an
exception for good faith challenges to the law.

291. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid."); Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
("When the government targets not subject matter but particular views taken by speakers on
a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.").
292. As William H. Simon notes:
Some cases are easy. (Although not everyone will have the same list of easy
cases, each person will have some list of cases she finds easy, and some cases
will appear on most people’s lists). Advice that facilitates violence and largescale property crime will usually seem clearly inappropriate. Advice that
facilitates moderate speeding, misprision of felony, and consensual fornication
will usually seem proper, or at least tolerable. Other cases are harder.
Simon, supra note 289, at 250.
293. See supra note 290 and accompanying text (articulating the standard of review
required).
294. See, e.g., Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH. L. REV.
287, 289 (1994) (arguing that "lawyer advice should be regulated only by the substantive
law and not by the lawyer ethics laws" but not addressing First Amendment issues).
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1. Constitutional Restrictions: Ban on Advice to Engage in BrandenburgType Activity or to Engage in Criminal or Fraudulent Activity, Provided
an Exception Exists for Good Faith Challenges to Law
Under Brandenburg v. Ohio295 a ban on legal advice "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or
produce such action" would survive First Amendment scrutiny.296
Similarly, a ban on advice to engage in criminal or fraudulent activity like
that found in ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) ought to withstand First Amendment
scrutiny provided that an exception exists for good faith challenges to the
law.297 Indeed, a version of this restriction currently exists in every state,
based on ABA Model Rule 1.2(d),298 which provides:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct
with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
law.299

This rule satisfies the government’s concern that an attorney not endorse or
participate in a client’s crime or fraud. At the same time, the rule allows an
attorney to advise a client, when appropriate, about legal strategies for
testing or challenging a law.300 The rule also allows an attorney to advise a
295. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that
speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action"
and it is "likely to incite or produce such action").
296. Id. at 447 (citations omitted).
297. My research resulted in no cases where Model Rule 1.2 was successfully
challenged under the First Amendment, and this is confirmed by others engaging in the
endeavor. See, e.g., Hersh v. U.S. ex rel Mukasey, 553 F.3d 743, 756 (5th Cir. 2008) ("The
parties do not cite and this court could not find any case in which [Model Rule 1.2], as
adopted by a state, has been challenged as a violation of the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech."). This, perhaps, is because others agree that the Rule is constitutional
and would survive strict scrutiny. It may also be due to the difficulties of raising such a
challenge, as it inevitably would require a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
298. California is the only exception, though it has adopted a similar provision as part
of its professional conduct rules:
A member shall not advise the violation of any law, rule, or ruling of a tribunal
unless the member believes in good faith that such law, rule, or ruling is invalid.
A member may take appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of any
law, rule, or ruling of a tribunal.
CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-210 (1989).
299. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010).
300. See McMorrow, supra note 182, at 159–61 (explaining how Model Rule 1.2(d)
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client about any proposed course of conduct, whether criminal, fraudulent,
or otherwise.301 The Comments302 to the rule recognize that "[t]here is a
critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of
questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or
fraud might be committed with impunity."303 The Comments acknowledge
that at times, "determining the validity of interpretation of a statute or
regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the
statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental
authorities."304 In expanding on the allowance for advice about challenging
the law under Model Rule 1.2(d), the Comments further provide:
Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting
a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not
preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual
consequences that appear likely to result from a client’s conduct. Nor
does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is
criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of
action.305

Professor Pepper explains that, "[t]he line drawn in Rule 1.2(d) is between
directing, suggesting, or assisting in criminal or fraudulent conduct, on the
one hand, and providing information about the law (‘legal consequences’)
on the other."306 There is a much broader allowance for advice about
noncriminal or nonfraudulent activity.307
As an example of the application of Model Rule 1.2, consider the
dilemma of medical marijuana.308 A number of states have legalized the
allows for an attorney to counsel a client about engaging in civil disobedience).
301. See id. at 160 (stating that "Model Rule 1.2 . . . emphasize[s] the full range of
information to which the client is entitled" and that "[t]he fact that the client uses the advice
to commit an illegal act" is not enough to make a lawyer complicit).
302. While not authoritative, the "Comments are intended as guides to interpretation"
for the Model Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 21.
303. Id. R. 1.2 cmt. ¶ 9.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Pepper, supra note 6, at 1588.
307. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2010) (stating that, generally, "[a]
lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation").
308. I am grateful to Michael Traynor, Co-Chair of the American Bar Association
Commission on Ethics 20/20, for suggesting this example and including me in discussions
about legal advice on medical marijuana, as well as to Allan Hopper, Litigation Director,
ACLU Drug Law Reform Project, for sharing his materials presented at the American Bar
Association 2010 Annual Meeting.
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distribution of marijuana for medicinal purposes, though the practice
remains illegal under federal law.309 This raises an important question
recently considered by Maine’s Professional Ethics Commission:
"[W]hether and how an attorney might act in regard to a client whose
intention is to engage in conduct which is permitted by state law and which
might not, currently, be prosecuted under federal law, but which
nonetheless is a federal crime."310 Model Rule 1.2(d) bans a lawyer from
counseling a client to engage in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal, and
in this example, if the Model Rule stopped there, a lawyer would be unable
to advise a client to distribute marijuana because it is a federal crime. But
the Model Rule does not stop there; it allows advice about any proposed
course of conduct, and the Rule allows a lawyer to counsel or assist, indeed
to give advice to engage, in good faith efforts to determine the validity,
scope, meaning, or application of the law that may require disobedience of
a statute or regulation.311 As such, it allows for a broad range of legal
advice in the medical marijuana example.
Consider also the advice ban in Milavetz.312 Given the Supreme
Court’s narrowed construction and requirement that the ban be read
consistent with Model Rule 1.2,313 one might argue that it should withstand
First Amendment scrutiny. The Court says as much in the Milavetz
309. See Michelle Patton, The Legalization of Marijuana: A Dead-End or the High
Road to Fiscal Solvency, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 163, 163 (2010) ("California . . . became
the first state to legalize the medical use of marijuana. Since then fourteen other states have
followed suit.").
310. See Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar, Maine Professional Ethics Commission
Opinions, Advising Clients Concerning Maine’s Medical Marijuana Act (July 7, 2010),
http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic=mebar_overseers_ethics_opinions&
id=110134&v=article (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (urging "case by case" evaluation of
whether an attorney’s advice on establishing a medical marijuana distribution business
constitutes a permitted or forbidden activity based upon Rule 1.2(d), and advising that
"participation in this endeavor by an attorney involves a significant degree of risk") (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
311. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (pointing out that in certain
circumstances, a lawyer is allowed to advise a client to engage in civil disobedience); see
also Werme’s Case, 839 A.2d 1, 2 (N.H. 2003) (holding that attorney violated 1.2(d) and
rejecting First Amendment argument because attorney failed to exercise "good faith options
readily available" to challenge a disputed statute and instead counseled the client to violate
the statute directly).
312. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (describing how the Milavetz Court
upheld the BAPCPA ban on attorney advice).
313. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (stating that the Court used and
justified a narrow reading of the BAPCPA ban by implicitly requiring that the ban be read
consistent with Model Rule 1.2).
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opinion.314 The problem, however, is that on the statute’s face, there is no
reference to Model Rule 1.2 or a similarly explicit allowance for advice
about good-faith challenges to the statute.315 Without that explicit
language, the Milavetz ban remains troubling.316 Such a statutory ban must
be narrowly tailored on its face; a lawyer should not be left to hope that a
Court will interpret the ban in light of the ABA Model Rules.
2. Unconstitutional Restrictions: Ban on Advice to Engage in Legal
Activity or to Exercise Political Rights
Just as it is fairly easy to identify two constitutional restrictions on
legal advice, two unconstitutional restrictions seem equally obvious: A ban
on advice to engage in legal activity or to exercise political rights. Under
the precedent of Button and subsequent cases, it is clear that legislative
restrictions on an attorney’s advice to a client about engaging in lawful
activities or exercising political rights cannot withstand First Amendment
strict scrutiny.317 Thus, the ban at issue in HLP should be found
unconstitutional to the extent it applies to legal advice from an attorney,
especially if the legal advice relates to lawful, political activity.318 This is
not to say, however, that subjecting attorneys who advise foreign terrorist
organizations to a content-neutral licensing scheme is necessarily
unconstitutional under the free speech clause, though such a licensing
scheme may raise other concerns.319
314. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1338
(2010) ("[B]ecause Milavetz challenges the constitutionality of the statute, as narrowed, only
on vagueness grounds, we need not further consider whether the statute so construed
withstands First Amendment scrutiny.").
315. See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
316. This is the case at least to the extent a question exists about what constitutes the
"specific type of misconduct designed to manipulate the protections of the bankruptcy
system" that the Court says BAPCPA was intended to target. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1336.
317. See supra Part IV.A (describing how Button and subsequent Supreme Court cases
have indicated that under First Amendment strict scrutiny, bans on attorney advice to clients
concerning legal activity or the exercise of political rights will not be upheld).
318. That the ban applies only to those groups designated as foreign terrorist
organizations should not make a difference for First Amendment purposes. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. ¶ 5 (2010) ("Legal representation should not be
denied to people . . . whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval.").
319. For an argument that such a licensing scheme is constitutional and would allow for
the delivery of legal advice in the HLP case, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Scholars,
Attorneys, and Former Public Officials with Experience in Terrorism-Related Issues in

ATTORNEY ADVICE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

699

B. The More Difficult Cases
1. Questionable Advice
The more difficult cases occur when a lawyer delivers questionably
illegal advice. The reality is that such advice is delivered not infrequently.
As Peter Henning notes, "legal advice involves the very possibility that the
conduct at issue will be illegal; otherwise, there would be no need to
consult a lawyer."320 In some cases, advice to break the law is expressly
anticipated (and even invited) by the law, whereas in other cases such
advice might render the lawyer criminally complicit. Professor Pepper
describes this as a continuum, where at one end is "advice about conduct
that most lawyers would not categorize as ‘unlawful,’ but to which the law
applies a sanction," for example "[a]dvice about breach of contract."321 He
explains that our "modern understanding of contract law is that one is free
to breach a contract, but may thereafter be required to pay compensatory
damages. Absent very unusual circumstances, there will be no
punishment."322 For Pepper, at the other end of the spectrum "is legal
advice the client may use for clearly criminal conduct involving concrete
harm to third parties. The classic example is the client who asks which
South American countries have no extradition treaty with the United States
covering armed robbery or murder."323 Professor Gordon similarly notes a
variety of questionable lawyering examples. He acknowledges that
"[l]awyers can and do help plaintiffs to pursue frivolous and unjust claims
to extort settlements, and they help defendants resist valid and just claims
through delay and discovery abuse."324 Even worse, "[l]awyers can and do
lobby for bad laws and rulings that promote special interests over any
Support of Petitioners, supra note 68. Other concerns may be presented by the licensing
requirement, such as client confidentiality and access to counsel. See, e.g., Troxel, supra
note 68, at 643 ("The problem with licensing legal services is that it may require attorneys to
violate client confidences.").
320. Henning, supra note 248, at 687.
321. Pepper, supra note 6, at 1550.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer—A Brief Informal History of a Myth with
Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1170 (2009) (citations omitted). On
the other hand, Gordon also recognizes that "lawyers are also the principal instrumentalities
for producing the public goods sought from the effective operation of the legal system—the
protection of individual rights, equal justice between persons, security and public order, and
the implementation of policies designed to promote the common welfare." Id. (citations
omitted).
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plausible view of the general welfare, and by means of procedural tactics or
strained interpretations effectively resist and even nullify good laws."325
Putting it another way, Colin Marks and Nancy Rapoport find that the
problem frequently is one of "line-drawing" when delivering legal advice.
They note that clients "may want to ‘test’ the line or urge that the line be
moved in some way." 326 Or it may be that the line is ill-defined. They also
concede that "some clients (and some lawyers) couldn’t locate the line
between right and wrong with a map and a divining rod."327
On the other hand, William Simon points out that many would "feel
strongly" that clients have an entitlement to know whether certain laws are
unenforced, or unlikely to be enforced, such as "laws against fornication,
sodomy, misprision of felony (failing to report someone else’s criminal
activity), small stakes gambling, marijuana possession, and non-payment of
employment taxes for part-time domestic workers."328 Rob Vischer
cautions that "an attorney’s moral perspective often determines the advice
she gives" and he calls upon the "legal profession to recognize that . . .
clients will be better off if that perspective is articulated openly and
deliberately."329 This is especially critical, he argues, in situations where
attorneys become "so enmeshed in [a client’s] culture that their legal
advice" ultimately is tailored to immoral and illegal ends.330 However,
restricting an attorney’s ability to advise her client about the various
courses of action to pursue, or prohibiting an attorney from offering lawful
advice to a particular client, ultimately does not solve the problem of linedrawing or questionable advice.331 Nor do advice bans necessarily address
325. Id.
326. Colin Marks & Nancy Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer’s Role in a Contemporary
Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1290–91 (2009). As Robert Gordon has pointed out
to me, while we might all be able to agree that clients should not be deprived of information
about breaking a law, the difficult problem lies in recognizing that an attorney’s advice that a
client probably can get away with breaking the law is giving information and at the same
time is a form of tacit encouragement of law-breaking. Comment Nine to ABA Model Rule
1.2 addresses this tension by recognizing that "[t]here is a critical distinction between
presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means
by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity." MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. ¶ 9 (2010).
327. Marks & Rapoport, supra note 326, at 1291.
328. Simon, supra note 289, at 249–50.
329. Vischer, supra note 287, at 229.
330. See id. (citing the example of lawyers involved in the demise of Enron).
331. For example, none of the suggestions from Professor Vischer for addressing the
problem of amoral lawyering that occurred in situations like "the prisoner abuse at Abu
Ghraib, the demise of Enron, or the crippling institutional impact of the priest sex abuse
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the concerns regulators might have with the underlying conduct of the
clients.
2. Attorney as Advocate Versus Attorney as Advisor
Another difficulty in legislating restrictions on legal advice lies in
distinguishing the lawyer’s role as an advocate from the lawyer’s role as an
advisor. Kathleen Clark’s discussion about the ethical issues raised by the
Office of Legal Counsel torture memorandum (a subject of major
controversy regarding an attorney’s advice-giving duties332) offers an
important example of the various obligations a lawyer might face
depending upon the particular role assumed. Professor Clark separates a
lawyer’s obligations when acting as a legal advisor (to a client) from acting
as a legal advocate (before a tribunal or court).333 She explains:
When a lawyer gives legal advice . . . she has a professional obligation
of candor toward her client [not owed to the tribunal]. One finds this
obligation in [Model] Rule 2.1, which states that in representing a client,
"a lawyer shall . . . render candid advice." In advising a client, the
lawyer’s role is not simply to spin out creative legal arguments. It is to
offer her assessment of the law as objectively as possible. The lawyer
must not simply tell the client what the client wants to hear, but instead
must tell the client her honest assessment of what the law requires or
allows. Similarly, [Model] Rule 1.4(b) requires a lawyer to explain the
law adequately to her client, so that the client can make informed
decisions about the representation.334

scandal" contemplate federal bans on the scope of advice a lawyer may offer her client. Id.
at 273.
332. See, e.g., Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence, supra note 288, at 943 (discussing
Office of Legal Counsel attorney John Yoo’s "opinion rendered in the so-called ‘torture
memos’"); Peter Margulies, The Detainees’ Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy
Strategies in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 409–13 (2009) (addressing the civil
lawsuit against John Yoo regarding the torture memos filed on behalf of Jose Padilla by the
Yale National Litigation Project).
333. Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J.
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455, 456 (2005) (observing that "[w]henever a lawyer offers a
legal opinion, there is always a possibility that other legal actors will take a contrary view").
For further discussion on the differences between the adversary lawyering and transactional
lawyering, see Wendel, Professionalism, supra note 285, at 1182 ("[T]ransactional
lawyering . . . is so different from adversarial litigation that one wonders why anyone has
ever thought to analogize the role of lawyer from one context to the other." (citations
omitted)).
334. Clark, supra note 333, at 465–66.

702

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639 (2011)

The professional conduct rules allow, even require, a lawyer to "provide
advice that is contrary to the weight of authority, spinning out imaginative,
even ‘forward-leaning’ legal theories for the client to use."335 That said, as
Professor Clark further explains, "the candor obligation requires the lawyer
to inform the client that the weight of authority is contrary to that advice,
and that other legal actors may come to the opposite conclusion."336 It may
be that government constraint is perhaps more justifiable when it covers an
attorney’s advice in an advisor role and less justifiable if it applies to advice
that goes to advocacy.
Robert Gordon has described, on one side of the dilemma, the notion
that "[w]ithin a normative framework of liberal advocacy, the vindication of
individual rights, especially as against the state, requires that lawyers be
able to assert and pursue client interests free of external controls, especially
controls imposed by state officials."337 In contrast, he writes, "[o]thers
vehemently disagree, arguing that the duties of loyalty to client interests
must be balanced against and sometimes overridden by broad, more
amorphous obligations, such as the lawyer’s duties as ‘officer of the court,’
member of a public profession, and citizen with a responsibility to uphold
the rule of law."338 He concludes then that "disputes over the advocate’s
proper role cannot really be disputes over freedom versus regulation, but
rather over . . . the form and content of regulation."339 This debate "is
335. Id. at 467; see also Jack Goldsmith, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 203 (2007)
("Because the law is not always designed for or up to the task of the crisis, successful
leadership sometimes requires bending or breaking the law."). Eugene Volokh makes a
similar point related to advice provided by physicians: "[I]t’s far from clear that the
government should be completely free to regulate professionals’ speech to their clients. . . .
I’m fairly certain that doctors at least have the constitutional right to inform their patients of
the medical benefits of marijuana, and to urge the patients to lobby their legislators to enact
a medical marijuana exception." Volokh, Speech, supra note 2, at 1344; see also Norman
Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1931, 1938 (2008) (examining the "relationship between counseling lawlessness and
assisting law reform" in the Office of the Attorney General).
336. Clark, supra note 333, at 467 (citations omitted). Clark further notes: "A lawyer
who fails to warn a client about the possible illegality of proposed conduct has violated her
professional obligations." Id.
337. Gordon, The Independence, supra note 11, at 10 ("In its usual formulations, this
argument tends toward vacuity. Everyone concedes that even the most zealous advocate
must remain within the framework of professional ethical rules and the law.").
338. Id. at 11–12 ("Again, this description of the dispute tends toward the vacuous,
because the most zealous advocates know they must follow some rules and obey official
instructions given to those rules."); see also Gillers, Honorable Profession, supra note 287,
at 24–25 (describing how, outside the narrow context of litigation, professional ethics often
become too flexible when lawyers ignore duties other than those to their clients).
339. Gordon, The Independence, supra note 11, at 12; see also David B. Wilkins, Who
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implicated not only in such staple issues of ethics reform debates as that of
whether lawyers must or may reveal clients’ lies or frauds to adversaries or
regulators, but also in the great (and greatly contested) issue of the extent to
which lawyers should help or resist their clients’ attempts to evade or
nullify regulation."340
It is in the latter debate described by Professor Gordon that recent
federal legislation and regulatory efforts have intervened. Rather than
regulating (or in addition to regulating) the behavior of clients perceived by
Congress as undesirable, Congress and federal agencies have taken to
regulating legal advice, with bans on both the content and the recipients of
the advice.341 These bans may result in consequences well beyond the
deterrence or control of client misdeeds, consequences that compromise the
validity of legal representation and threaten the legal system’s integrity.342
To the extent Congress desires to control evasion (or nullification) of its
laws, other mechanisms exist that are more narrowly tailored to accomplish
this purpose than a ban on attorney advice.343

Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 887 (1992) ("Duties to the legal
framework require different kinds of maintenance than obligations owed to clients. . . .
[T]he question to be asked is not who should regulate lawyers, but rather how should
policymakers . . . increase the likelihood that all segments of society can benefit from a
competent and independent legal profession.").
340. Gordon, The Independence, supra note 11, at 12.
341. In addition to the federal statutes at issue in Milavetz and HLP, consider the efforts
by the Department of Justice to discourage legal advice for business organizations subject to
federal prosecution. As Peter Henning explains, "[t]he recent spate of misconduct in large,
publicly traded corporations has led to what can be viewed as a new form of
overcriminalization—the targeting of legal advice as an obstacle in pursuing the
investigation of corporate wrongdoing." Henning, supra note 248, at 671. Henning cites as
an example the 2003 Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations issued by
the Department of Justice that "announced a set of principles to guide federal prosecutors in
deciding whether to charge a corporation with a crime" including factors such as waiver of
corporate attorney-client privilege and work product protection, the advance of attorneys’
fees, and information sharing under a joint defense agreement. Id. at 672–73.
342. See supra Part II and Part III.A (discussing legal precedent on advice bans and
illustrating the consequences of advice bans for the practice of law and the American legal
system).
343. Infra Part IV.C; see also Tony Mauro, Court to Hear Case on Material Support
for Terrorists, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 1, 2009 (quoting Georgetown University Law Center
professor David Cole: "We don’t make the country safer by criminalizing those who
advocate nonviolent means for resolving disputes").
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3. Government Lawyers

While the Court has not specifically addressed the free speech rights of
government lawyers when rendering legal advice, two of the Court’s
opinions on government employee speech involved lawyers, and deserve
attention here. The Court refused to find First Amendment protection for
the speech at issue in these cases. Both involved government lawyers
raising workplace-related concerns and suffering adverse employment
consequences, but neither addressed legal advice rendered by the lawyers.
In Connick v. Myers,344 the Court held 5–4 that the termination of an
assistant district attorney’s employment based on her circulation of a
questionnaire that addressed workplace concerns did not violate the First
Amendment.345 Connick is distinguishable from the concerns of this Article
in that it involved an employee grievance, not legal advice.346 The advice
an attorney delivers to her employer is not the same as a complaint
concerning office policy or an office dispute.347 As Justice Brennan,
writing for the dissent, explained, "[t]he First Amendment affords special
protection to speech that may inform public debate about how our society is
to be governed—regardless of whether it actually becomes the subject of a
public controversy."348 Attorney advice falls under this protection.
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,349 the Court again held 5–4 that the First
Amendment rights of a government employee (who happened to be a
deputy district attorney) were not violated when he suffered adverse
employment actions in retaliation for whistleblowing.350 But this opinion,
344. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (holding that First Amendment rights
of assistant district attorney discharged for circulation of questionnaire regarding office
conditions to co-workers were not violated).
345. See id. at 154 ("The limited First Amendment interest involved here does not
require that Connick tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office,
undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships.").
346. Id. at 141.
347. Id. at 153 ("When employee speech concerning office policy arises from an
employment dispute concerning the very application of that policy to the speaker, additional
weight must be given the supervisor’s view that the employee has threatened the authority of
the employer to run the office.").
348. Id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
349. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that the First
Amendment does not apply to speech of public employees made "pursuant to their official
duties").
350. See id. ("We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.").
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too, says nothing about whether the First Amendment protects the legal
advice rendered by a government attorney.351 The majority did state that
"[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee
might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of
employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or
created."352 The free speech protection for legal advice, however, does not
flow solely from an attorney’s rights as a public citizen. As discussed
earlier in Part III.C, legal advice encompasses important political attributes
as well as client rights and attorney-client relationship values.353
Further, under the Court’s holding in Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez, the outcomes of Connick and Garcetti should not be read as
applying to legal advice.354 The Garcetti majority explicitly recognized
"that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction
implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for
by this court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence" and, therefore,
did not "decide whether the analysis [in Garcetti] would apply in the same
manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching."355 A
similar argument can be made about legal advice. As Justice Breyer,
writing in dissent, explained:
[T]he speech at issue is professional speech—the speech of a lawyer.
Such speech is subject to the independent regulation by canons of the
profession. Those canons provide an obligation to speak in certain
instances. And where that is so, the government’s own interest in
forbidding that speech is diminished. . . . The objective specificity and
For a thought-provoking discussion of concerns unique to national security advice rendered
by government lawyers, see generally Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence, supra note 284.
351. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424 ("[T]he parties in this case do not dispute that
Ceballos wrote his disposition memo pursuant to his employment duties. We thus have no
occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s
duties in cases where there is room for serious debate.").
352. Id. at 421–22 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995)).
353. See supra notes 189–203 (discussing the political value involved in free speech
rights of attorneys).
354. Justice Souter, writing in dissent, would go so far as to apply Legal Services Corp.
v. Velazquez to protect the whistleblowing activity in Garcetti. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437
("Some public employees are hired to ‘promote a particular policy’ by broadcasting a
particular message set by the government, but not everyone working for the government,
after all, is hired to speak from a government manifesto." (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting))).
355. Id. at 425.
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public availability of the profession’s canons also help to diminish the
risk that the courts will improperly interfere with the government’s
necessary authority to manage its work.356

Finally, the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Polk County v. Dodson357 offers
guidance here: "A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends,
employs, or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or
regulate his professional judgment in rendering such legal services."358
That government lawyers are employed and paid by the government cannot
dictate the scope and contours of the legal advice rendered to the
government.
C. Solutions Beyond Bans on Attorney Advice
When an attorney gives mistaken, immoral, or illegal advice,
procedures exist to remedy or otherwise address the consequences that
result. For example, as Peter Henning notes, "[m]alpractice suits provide
clients with a means of redress when the lawyer was negligent in the
representation. Similarly, even if the lawyer was not negligent, a breach of
fiduciary duty can result in an award of damages or a return of the legal
fees."359 Additionally, "[e]ach state maintains an extensive disciplinary
apparatus for reviewing complaints against lawyers and can impose
sanctions against lawyers from private admonitions to suspensions and even
disbarment for serious misconduct."360 And, of course, attorneys remain
subject to criminal sanctions.361
What might a legislative ban on advice achieve that existing
protections do not? A cynical view likely sees the bans as nothing more
356. Id. at 446–47 (citations omitted). Justice Breyer would have employed the
Pickering balancing test here, i.e. "that the government should prevail unless the employee
(1) ‘speaks on a matter of unusual importance,’ and (2) ‘satisfies high standards of
responsibility in the way he does it.’" Id. at 448 (quoting Souter, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
357. Polk Cnty v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320 (1981) (holding "that a public defender
does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as
counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding"). But see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 51–
52 (1988) (declining to extend holding of Polk County to cover a physician).
358. Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(B) (1976)).
359. Henning, supra note 248, at 693.
360. Id.
361. See id. at 684–85 (listing crimes for which lawyers have been prosecuted including
"embezzlement of client trust funds, insider trading, and the use of confidential information
for their own benefit" as well as money laundering and bankruptcy fraud (citation omitted)).
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than empty political gestures. Perhaps the bans are meant to have a
deterrent effect, particularly when hefty civil or criminal penalties are
attached. An important area for future research would be to conduct an
empirical assessment of advice bans to determine how they alter attorneys’
advice, if they do at all. This sort of foundation may be particularly helpful
in demonstrating to the Roberts Court why the advice rendered by an
attorney is unique and warrants special protection from undue government
control.362
The problematic nature of legislative advice bans under the First
Amendment does not mean that other mechanisms cannot be adopted to
address concerns about advice that enables or facilitates law-breaking. One
response to address these concerns about attorney advice might be found in
the regulation of lawyers as gatekeepers,363 compliance monitors,364 and
whistleblowers.365 For example, perhaps the appropriate check against
problematic legal advice would be a heightened reporting requirement and
relaxed confidentiality standards when an attorney has knowledge of ongoing, covert wrongdoing.366 The proposals to regulate lawyers as
362. See Knake, The Supreme Court’s, supra note 23, at 1565–66 (discussing cases
from the 2009 term where the Court expressed interest in empirical support for the position
taken by the ABA on behalf of the consequences to lawyers and law practice).
363. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 7, at 582–83 ("All lawyers are ‘gatekeepers’ in the
obvious sense that they may not knowingly assist clients in unlawful conduct and some have
long had modest duties to monitor their clients as well."); see also David B. Wilkins, Making
Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1164
n.80 (1993) ("[D]efining a ‘whistleblower’ strategy as one that ‘compels third parties to
disclose misconduct directly to potential victims or to enforcement officials.’" (citing Reinier
H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986))); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A
Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75,
111–17 (1993) (discussing reputational incentives and legal incentives along with the costs
and benefits of their adoption in relation to lawyers as gatekeepers).
364. See Christine E. Parker, Robert Eli Rosen & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, The Two
Faces of Lawyers: Professional Ethics and Business Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 201, 207 (2009) (discussing "mechanisms through which . . . research has
suggested that businesses’ use of lawyers should increase business compliance with the law"
and explaining that these mechanisms are "examples of lawyers being expected to act as
‘monitors’ of their clients’ compliance").
365. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within
Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1251–63 (2009)
(discussing concerns present when public and private sector attorneys are not protected for
whistleblowing).
366. Peter Margulies makes a similar recommendation in his authoritative treatment of
lawyers’ independence and collective illegality, observing that "[i]n the government lawyer
scenario, further leverage for gatekeeping could be obtained by reading the provisions
permitting disclosure in cases of reasonably certain substantial bodily harm or death [under
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gatekeepers or to protect lawyers as whistleblowers place varying duties on
the lawyer that include refusing to assist clients in questionable activities,
monitoring client activity, and external reporting of bad client behavior.
Altering a lawyer’s traditional role through these additional obligations has
met criticism. For example, John Leubsdorf explains that, "the lawyer
increasingly becomes not just an advocate and advisor but a gatekeeper as
well, so that not just the details of legal representation but its rationale and
function are changing."367 Thus, Professor Leubsdorf concludes, "even
when the new regulations appear to leave intact the substance of previous
rules balancing the interests of clients and those of nonclients, they often
impose more stringent penalties that will sway lawyers to pay more
attention to the latter."368 On the other hand, Sung Kim argues, at least in
the context of corporate business, "as an internal advisor, compliance
overseer, and external liaison, inside counsel are well-positioned to access
critical information that may reveal company misconduct."369
Another possible response to address troubling attorney advice is
proposed by Peter Margulies in what he calls "equipoise as a working
approach."370 Acknowledging the complicity of attorneys in "terrorism,
organized crime, and government and corporate misconduct"371 he argues
for a substitution of "branding and gatekeeping norms"372 in place of "an
amorphous invocation of independence"373 that occurs when "courts and
commentators" evaluate attorney advice.374 Professor Margulies recognizes
that "[a]ll lawyers establish a brand—a distinctive professional identity . . .
[which] serves constitutional and social interests."375 At the same time,
ABA Model Rule 1.6] to include disclosure of a policy like the coercive interrogation
program." Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence, supra note 288, at 979. For other
possibilities, see Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, 8 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 25–37 (2002) (proposing reforms such as professional independence,
disclosure obligations, professional accountability, liability standards, substantive standards
and professional norms, and professional education).
367. John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009).
368. Id.
369. Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 452 (2008).
370. Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence, supra note 288, at 952.
371. Id. at 942.
372. Id. at 941.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. As examples of constitutional or social interests in a lawyer’s professional
identity, Professor Margulies cites "the late William Kunstler, who defined his professional
identity in opposition to the state, . . . lawyers for the government who drafted the torture
memos saw themselves as vindicating the Framers’ vision of the separation of powers[,] . . .

ATTORNEY ADVICE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

709

"[a]s professionals, however, lawyers must balance branding with
gatekeeping,"376 that is, "safeguard[ing] the public’s interest in a fashion
that may check and balance short-term client preferences."377
To achieve this balance, Professor Margulies turns to "equipoise"
under two conditions:
"freedom from prior knowledge of client
wrongdoing and freedom to give the client bad news."378 He also offers
several suggestions in the context of national security advice rendered by
the Office of Legal Counsel, suggestions that warrant consideration for
wider use by attorneys generally: (1) disclosure of legal opinions as a safe
harbor; (2) revision of ABA Model Rule 2.1 to require, rather than permit,
"advice that goes beyond doctrine, to assess . . . non-legal ramifications;"
and (3) extending ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(2)’s requirement to disclose
directly adverse, controlling legal authority to include not only the court,
but also the client.379 Similar to the concept of a disclosure safe harbor,
other commentators have proposed that a solution "may be for an attorney
to ‘make a record’ of the advice given in the context of a court
proceeding . . . [a sort of] declaratory judgment to validate the legal
advice,"380 or for an attorney to engage in "full-picture counseling[, i.e.]
giving the client the full picture . . . to enable the client to choose a course
of action that the client, while aware of societal interests in the legal
measure, considers appropriate."381
Other legal ethics experts advocate reforms by legal employers and
educators. For example, Professor Rhode urges legal employers "to
[and] lawyers for Enron and the like viewed themselves as championing innovation in the
financial markets." Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 982.
378. Id.
379. Margulies, True Believers, supra note 207, at 81–82. For further support of
disclosure as an effective safe-harbor, see generally Wendel, Professionalism, supra note
281. Wendel suggests:
[T]he only reason lawyers . . . may have been comfortable arguing for the
formally plausible interpretation [in cases where legal advice led to wrongdoing]
is that they expected some degree of secrecy, either through the audit lottery (in
the case of tax shelters), the cover provided by byzantine transactions and
obfuscated disclosures (the Enron manipulations), or geographic isolation and
covert activities (the interrogations at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.
Id. at 1175.
380. Joel Cohen & Norman Bloch, Can Lawyers Be Prosecuted for the Advice They
Give?, N.Y.L.J., July 23, 1991, at 1.
381. Jamie G. Heller, Note, Legal Counseling in the Administrative State: How to Let
the Client Decide, 103 YALE L.J. 2503, 2504 (1994).

710

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639 (2011)

integrate ethical considerations into all organizational functions,"382 "[m]ore
protections for whistleblowing are equally critical,"383 "enhanced
gatekeeping requirements for corporate counsel,"384 "[m]ore stringent
ethical requirements and oversight systems . . . for indigent defense
counsel,"385 and "more public accountability for professional
performance"386 as well as law school curriculum reform.387 Similarly,
Professor Vischer suggests that "[t]he road out of amoral lawyering starts
with a profession-wide emphasis on greater moral sensitivity and selfawareness among attorneys. Certainly this effort must begin in law
schools . . . [and] regulation also has a role to play in the effort."388
A complete discussion about the range of reforms that might be
adopted to curtail attorney advice in the law-bending or law-breaking
activity of clients is beyond the scope of this Article, but these examples
demonstrate that many viable and better-suited options exist beyond bans
on legal advice. To suggest that these concerns could be effectively
addressed by federal or state legislation controlling the advice an attorney
offers (or cannot offer) to a client is problematic on a number of levels in
addition to the First Amendment concerns.389 Such constraints run afoul of
ethical obligations and professional conduct rules and norms.390 They also
compromise what Fred Zacharias characterizes as society’s "interest in
having clients consult lawyers about legal issues and receive advice
regarding the lawfulness of their conduct."391 Moreover, David Wilkins
382. Rhode, supra note 245, at 1335.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1336.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 1337.
387. Id.
388. Vischer, supra note 287, at 271–72. Vischer also notes: "One meaningful step
would be to encourage attorneys to begin talking about moral considerations generally with
their client . . . [but ultimately] [a]ttorneys must realize that brining their own moral
perspective into their dialogues with clients is not a paternalistic power play; it is an
essential component of ethical lawyering." Id. at 272.
389. See, e.g., supra notes 99–120 and accompanying text (suggesting potential First
Amendment conflicts with attorney advice bans).
390. See Renee Newman Knake, Contemplating Free Speech and Congressional
Efforts to Constrain Legal Advice, 37 RUTGERS L. REC. 12, 18 (2010) ("Not only do
Congressional constraints like the BAPCPA and AEDPA provisions present serious First
Amendment concerns with regard to their limits on the delivery of legal advice, but they also
contradict an attorney’s established ethical duties.").
391. Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules Work?, 47
B.C. L. REV. 455, 494 (2006). Zacharias also notes:
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maintains that "[i]f lawyers were to comply only with the literal commands
of clear rules, and advise their clients to do likewise, many important
societal goals would be frustrated." 392 He gives the example of lawyers’
refusal during the McCarthy era to represent political dissidents, which
"undermine[d] society’s commitment to preserving the right to free speech
expression and other important democratic liberties."393 He also recognizes,
however, that "if tax lawyers systematically choose to exploit the
indeterminacy of the legal standards regarding what constitutes proper tax
advice, the entire revenue collection system would be endangered."394 The
solution, Professor Wilkins maintains, is that "society must rely on
something other than direct enforcement to ensure that a proper content is
infused in these norms. Independence claims properly seek to occupy this
discretionary space."395 Professor Wendel makes a similar point in writing
about the independence of government lawyers. He explains that
"[l]awyers cannot understand their role as merely executing their clients’
preferences; the distinctive function of lawyers is that they act as agents of
their clients, but only within the bounds of the law."396 Yet Wendel also
acknowledges that "the meaning of the law is a function, in part, of the
acceptability of the interpretation to a professional community."397 Thus he
concludes that "the only way to evaluate whether lawyers have given advice
within the bounds of the law is to engage the interpretative arguments on
their own terms."398 Ultimately, he joins in the suggestions of others that
the solution lies with attorneys and the legal academy.399
Arguably, society may even be willing to insist that clients follow that advice to
the extent that it identifies actions that clients must avoid to satisfy the law. On
the surface, however, the interest in promoting law-abiding behavior cuts against
rules that would allow lawyers to threaten clients into acting morally or into
avoiding wrongful actions for which there is a legitimate argument in favor of
their lawfulness. Clients are unlikely to confide in a lawyer whom they know
can force them to abide by her personal moral code.
Id.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Wilkins, supra note 339, at 861.
Id.
Id. at 861–62.
Id. at 862.
W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 1333, 1362 (2009).
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. See id. (arguing that "the only way to evaluate whether lawyers have given advice
within the bounds of the law is to engage the interpretive arguments on their own terms,"
which "is something that lawyers and legal scholars are well-equipped to do"). Deborah
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V. Conclusion

Given the integral role of attorneys in America’s democratic
government, it seems reasonable, if not imperative, that this category of
speech—attorney advice—should be fiercely guarded from unnecessary
regulation. This is not to say that legal advice may never be restricted. But
any constraint ought to satisfy strict scrutiny—that is, be necessary to
further a compelling government interest and narrowly tailored to do so
using the least restrictive means possible. This is especially true when the
advice relates to a client’s political activity, whether that activity involves
the exercise of rights under a federal statute or working with controversial
organizations through nonviolent, peaceful means.400 The Milavetz ban
(even under the narrowed construction401) and the HLP prohibition (in its
Rhode contends that "individual lawyers need to become more effective monitors of their
own advice." Rhode, supra note 245, at 1334. Rhode cites suggestions from several other
leading legal ethics scholars:
David Luban suggests that when lawyers’ advice reaches the result that a client
wants, they should ask themselves whether the advice would be the same if the
client asked the identical question but wanted a different outcome. Robert
Gordon proposes that lawyers consider whether a fair minded, fully-informed
observer, or a judge committed to serving the law’s societal objectives, would
find their position persuasive. Many business ethics experts suggest a variation
on those questions: "How would it feel to defend that position on the evening
news?"
Id. at 1334 (citations omitted).
For a significant discussion of "social science research to suggest strategies that both
lawyers and clients can take to minimize the risk of overly partisan legal advice," see
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1, 40
(2009). Professor Robertson cautions against regulating role separation to "encourage
lawyers’ independence from their clients." Id. at 38. Instead, she "recommends a more
modest approach to increase the salience of lawyers’ professional identities and to minimize
the biases that result from subordination of that identity." Id. at 47. In yet another important
proposal for balancing these concerns in the context of rendering national security advice,
Peter Margulies contends that lawyers "should expressly consider institutional culture’s
impact." Peter Margulies, National Security Lawyering and the Persistent Neglect of
Institutional Culture, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5187, 5187 (2009). In other words, "[i]n
the government lawyer context, the interaction of a legal opinion with institutional culture
may determine if the lawyer is reasonable in assuming that the limits of the opinion will be
observed, or whether the force of ingrained culture will overwhelm those limits." Id. at
5191–92. Professor Margulies would require "[i]f the limits are vulnerable, [that] the lawyer
should reconsider the advice and either require more limits on the conduct authorized or
forego authorization entirely." Id. at 5192.
400. See supra notes 317–19 and accompanying text (discussing regulation of legal
advice connected to political activity).
401. See supra notes 32–55 and accompanying text (discussing Milavetz).
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coverage of legal advice about lawful activity402) fail the strict scrutiny test.
Even if it can be argued that the government holds a compelling interest in
regulating attorney advice based on concerns about bankruptcy abuse or
national security, because these bans contain no explicit exception for
good-faith legal challenges (and, in the case of HLP, the ban prohibits
otherwise lawful advice) it is difficult to reach any conclusion other than
that they are neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive means
possible to further the government’s interest.
The cases of Milavetz and HLP reveal the crucial First Amendment
rights of lawyers and clients that are at stake when legislative limitations
are placed on legal advice. In the wake of these decisions, it appears that
the Supreme Court is likely to treat attorney advice as speech, rather than
conduct, for First Amendment purposes. Whether attorney advice will
warrant strict scrutiny protection under the First Amendment remains an
open question, though both cases seem to suggest that this or a similarly
highly-protective test is appropriate, a conclusion compelled by the Court’s
attorney speech precedent and relevant First Amendment theory as this
Article documents.
In addition to pushing the question of First Amendment protection for
attorney advice into the forefront of constitutional law and legal ethics, the
Milavetz and HLP cases may have considerable repercussions for clients
who need complete and accurate legal advice about bankruptcy or
humanitarian aid efforts, and for their attorneys who are under ethical
obligations to deliver that information. The Supreme Court’s rulings in
these cases also may adversely impact the ability of attorneys to offer
advice in other areas of law. The Court’s affirmation of the statutory
restriction on legal advice in Milavetz, albeit a narrow reading of the
restriction, along with the outcome of HLP potentially encourages similar
restraints in the future. To fully understand the practical ramifications of
legislative bans on legal advice, further empirical study should be
undertaken. It is important to document in a systematic way how attorneys
(and their clients) respond to bans on advice and the consequences that
result.
This Article has endeavored to demonstrate that an attorney’s advice is
a category of speech deserving strong protection under the First
Amendment. Such speech ought not to be banned simply because Congress
or the states deem it undesirable, inappropriate, or even abusive, especially
where no safe harbor is made for counseling about actions designed to test
402.

See supra notes 56–84 and accompanying text (discussing HLP).
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or challenge the law at issue. Nor should it be banned because the
recipients of otherwise lawful advice are unpopular or disliked. An
attorney’s advice to her client is precisely the kind of speech that the First
Amendment was designed to protect.

